A Study of the Political Concepts and Theories of Mao Tse-Tung by Isom, Oliver Wendell
Fort Hays State University 
FHSU Scholars Repository 
Master's Theses Graduate School 
Summer 1959 
A Study of the Political Concepts and Theories of Mao Tse-Tung 
Oliver Wendell Isom 
Fort Hays Kansas State College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.fhsu.edu/theses 
 Part of the History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Isom, Oliver Wendell, "A Study of the Political Concepts and Theories of Mao Tse-Tung" (1959). Master's 
Theses. 654. 
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/theses/654 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at FHSU Scholars Repository. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of FHSU Scholars Repository. 
A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL CONCEPTS AND THEORIES 
OF MAO TSE-TUNG 
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the Degree of Master of Science 
by 
Oliver Wendell Isom, A.B. 
Fort Hays Kansas State College 
THESIS ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is an examination of the 
policies which were important in Mao Tse-tung 1 s rise to 
power in China and those policies which have been instru-
mental in keeping him in power. 
Documentary and secondary sources were consulted 
with secondary sources used only where insufficient docu-
mentary evidence existed or when they made a significant 
contribution to the subject. The study was confined pri-
marily to the four volumes of the English translation of 
the Selected Works of Hao Tse-tung and the three publica-
tions of the American Consulate General at Hong Kong en-
titled, Survey of the China Mainland Press, Current Back-
ground and Extracts from Chir 3. Mainland Magazines. 
The formation and foundation of Mao's political 
concepts consisted of his early education and contact with 
Communist ideologies, his theory of practice and the de-
velopment of his materialist-dialectic philosophy. 
Mao's use of the peasants in the Communist movement 
in China and his class analysis of the rural areas were 
part of the basis for his agrarian program. Major poli-
cies aiding his program were land reform, collectivization 
and the commune system. 
Examination of labor's role in the Chinese Communist 
ii 
movement and the division of the classes of labor show 
Mao's concept that labor must lead the revolution in China. 
His policies, such as the use of communes and the Trade 
Union Law, give examples of his efforts to bring labor to 
the front in the revolutionary movement. Mao is apparently 
trying to transform the broad masses of the peasantry into 
an industrial proletariat in support of his belief that 
this will make the Communist movement more stable. 
Mao Tse-tung has made extensive use of the military 
forces both in resisting the Japanese and in overthrowing 
the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek. The communes are de-
signed along military lines to give him more authority in 
all areas. This would imply that Mao is depending exten-
sively upon the military forces for his control of China. 
The early economic policies of Mao and the Chinese 
Communists were to proceed with all economic construction 
possible as well as essential and to concentrate on the 
agricultural and industrial programs in the formation of 
a sound economy. By the use of the commune system Mao 
hopes to build a strong economic basis for Communist China. 
Mao is attempting to control the education and culture 
of the Chinese people as closely as possible. His program 
is aimed at the young people with the New Democratic Youth 
League and the comrnune boarding schools designed to obtain 
the support of the youth. He also maintains that all art 
and literature should be adapted to fit the needs of the 
revolutionary movement . 
iii 
In the formation of the Chinese Communist government 
Mao maintains that two stages, new democracy and socialism 
are necessary to achieve Communism. More recent develop-
ments indicates Mao's belief that China is in the latter 
par t of the socialist stage and ready to advance into an 
early phase of the true Communistic state. His program of 
consolidation of the masse s and the elimination of feudal-
ism is important to the achievement of his goals. The 
commune system and the Chinese Communists' international 
relations are also important in the political organization 
of Mao's government. He reserves the right to interpret 
Communism to fit the needs of China, or, more correctly, 
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The years, 1918-1959, have been eventful years for 
the people of China . They have struggled to become a nation 
respected in international affairs and one with internal 
harmony among the people. Out of the numerous factions 
striving to achieve governmental control has arisen a strong 
Communistic government under the direction of Mao Tse-tung. 
It is the opinion of the writer that the policies which the 
Chinese Communists are pursuing are presently and will con-
tinue to have significant bearing on international affairs. 
These policies are designed to dominate completely, the 
lives of the Chinese people and those in any other areas 
in which Chinese Communists gain control. It seems to the 
writer, therefore, that it is necessary to have an under-
standing and insight into the development of the policies 
of the Chinese Communist government which has successfully 
controlled the more than 600 million people on the China 
mainland for the past ten years (1949-1959), and one that 
appears to be in command of the situation in China. Since 
Mao Tse-tung has been a major factor in bringing about Com-
munist domination of the China mainland, it is the purpose 
of this study to set forth and analyze some of his basic 
political concepts and theories. This writer has tried to 
present the major policies which have highlighted Mao's 
V 
rise to power and his policies which have been instrumental 
in keeping him in power since he achieved control of the 
great portion of the Chinese people. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to present the evo-
lution of Mao's political theories and concepts in directing 
the Communist movement in China. The thesis will not per-
tain directly to contemporaries or others who have had in-
fluence on his thinking. It is the hope of the writer that 
some of the information contained in this work will be help-
ful in forming a more vivid picture of the policies and 
practices of the Chinese Communists and their leader, Mao 
Tse-tung. 
Since the writer does not read Chinese, a fact which 
places him at a definite disadvantage, research was confined 
primarily to the four volumes entitled the Selected Works of 
Mao Tse-tung with English translation by the staff of Inter-
national Publishers of New York City and the three publica-
tions of the American Consulate General at Hong Kong, Survey 
of the China Mainland Press, Current Background and Extracts 
from China Mainland Magazines which are translated by the 
New China News Agency, the official Communist press of China, 
and do not reflect the opinion of the government of the 
United States. A number of documents obtained through cor-
respondence with Charles E. Luckett, Jr., Chief of the 
Government Branch for the Division of External Research and 
vi 
Publications for the State Department of the United States 
government have been most useful . 
To exhaust adequately the materials relative to this 
subject would require work in Chinese Communist government 
documents and access to Mao's private papers and library, 
neither source being available to the writer owing to the 
non-recognition policy of the government of the United 
States toward Communist China. The writer has tried, 
wherever possible, to compare sources of information on 
different items and for the most part has found the differ-
ent translations to have basically the same meaning. How-
ever, when two or more translations of the same item were 
available they were usually not found to be verbatim. 
Secondary sources were used only to bridge the areas where 
sufficient documentary evidence was not available or when 
they had important information on the subject. 
Special acknowledgement is given to Dr. Eugene R. 
Craine whose patient proofreading and critical analysis 
have added immeasurably to the content of this paper. His 
suggestions and guidance have been beneficial in preparing 
this paper . Miss Margaret van Ackeren, of the staff of 
Fort Hays Kansas State College Forsyth Library, extended 
me innumerable kindnesses. To Miss Jeanette Hillers of 
the Hastings, Nebraska, Public Library I express sincerest 
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appreciation for aid in obtaining numerous documentary ma-
terials . My wife , Gay Isom, in addition to doing routine 
things researchers seem to expect of their wives, has always 
radiated the kini of confidence that counts. 
CHAPTER I 
BASIS OF MAO TSE-TUNG I S POLITICAL CONCEPTS 
Mao Tse-tung was born in Shao San, in the Chinese 
Province of Hunan, in 1893. After attending primary and 
middle school at Changsha, he served in the revolutionary 
army of Sun Yat-sen from 1911 until he resurned his edu-
cation at the Hunan Normal School in 1912. Mao received 
his degree from the Normal School in 1918, and later the 
same year went to Peking where he studied and worked as a 
librarian at Peking University. 1 
While at Peking University, Mao carae in contact 
with Ch 1 en Tu-hsiu, Head of the Literature Department, and 
Li Ta-chao, Professor of History, who were to have a con-
siderable amount of influence o~ the polit ical concepts 
and theories of Mao. Not only were these men the founders 
of the Connnunist Party of China and the sponsors of 
Marxism-Leninism in China, but they were also arnong the 
few undisputed leaders of the entire body of Chinese 
westernized intelligentsia. Ch 1 en had a fairly consistent 
philosophy resting on the twin pillars of democracy and 
science. On the other hand, Li was definitely a man who 
l"Mao Tse-tung," Encyclopedia Americana ( 19.58 ed.), 
XVIII., 2.51. 
2 
leaned to metaphysical theories. However, because of the 
depressing milieu in which they found themselves and the 
impact of external events which occurred during the period 
from 1918 to 1920, they began to look for other methods of 
solving the social, political and cultural problems that 
were present in China at this time. They turned to Marxism-
Leninism because they thought this philosophy presented a 
possibility of developing a China which could stand on its 
own and bring an end to exploitation by other nations. 
Mao's contact with Ch 1en and Li came during their period 
of transition in political thought and this transition 
had some influence on Mao's own political thinking. 2 
Mao did not accept in its entirety either the phi-
losophies of Ch'en and Li or those of Marx and Ienin. 
Instead, he developed his own theories which have been 
named by students of the Chinese Communist revolution as 
Maoism. In Maoism one sees an adaptation of what Mao con-
siders the best of Marx and Lenin for China and Chinese 
nationalism. 
The Chinese Communist Party was organized at 
Shanghai on July 1, 1921, under the leadership of Ch'en 
2Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the 
Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press-,-1951), 7-18. Hereinafter cited as Schwartz, 
Chinese Communism. 
3 
Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao. Ch 1en Tu-hsiu was not present at 
the organizational meeting because he was in Canton at the 
time, but Mao Tse-tung was among the twelve men who attended 
this important meeting.3 Soon after the organizational 
meeting of the Communist Party, Mao proved himself better 
able than either Li or Ch'en to understand the principles 
of Marxism-Leninism as a program of action by adapting it 
to the needs of the Chinese revolution. Some of the others 
present soon found themselves in opposition to Marxism-
Leninism.4 
During the period, 1923-1926, the Kuomintang Party 
and the Communist Party of China worked together to organ-
ize a coalition government that would satisfy both factions. 
The Chinese Communists entered this government because they 
3The twelve delegates who attended were Chang 
Kuo-t 1 ao, Ch 1en Kung-po, Ch 1 en T 1 an-ch 1 iu, Ch 1en Wang-tao, 
Chou Fu-hai, Ho Shu-heng, Li Han-chun, Li Ta, Liu Jen-ching, 
Pao Hui-seng, Tung Pi-wu and Mao Tse-tung. Officers elec-
ted were Ch 1 en Tu-hsiu (Chairman of the Chinese Communist 
Party), Chou Fu-hai (Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist 
Party), Chang Kuo-t 1 ao (Chairman of Organization) and Li Ta 
(Chairman of Propaganda). Also in attendance was Maring 
(also given as Mahlin) representing the Communist Inter-
national. Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and Jobn K. 
Fairbank,! Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), 30. 
Hereinafter cited as Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank, Docu-
mentary History. 
4schwartz, Chinese Communism, 26. 
4 
were instructed to do so by the Comintern which was con-
trolled by Russia. Neither party was strong enough to 
organi ze a government of its own so they worked together to 
get a foothold and then when the opportunity presented it-
self each would try to destroy the other. By 1926 Chiang 
Kai-shek seemed to be fairly secure as the leader of the 
Kuomintang Party and he introduced a program designed to 
destroy the Communist Party; however, he only succeeded in 
forcing the Communist movement underground. 
Neither were the Communists idle, and, in 1926, Mao 
Tse-tung was sent to the province of Hunan to organize the 
peasants of that area into a military force to oppose the 
Kuomintang army. This order did not authorize the formation 
of Peasants Associations but authorized only a military 
force to bring about a peasant uprising. Because this 
peasant uprising failed Mao was dismissed from the Communist 
Party early in 1927. In February of 1927, Mao made his, 
"Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in 
Hunan, 11 discussing the progress that had been made to that 
time . One of the major accomplishments of the "Report" was 
to win widespread attention for Mao as it was published in 
three Chinese journals and translated into Russian. Brandt 
states that the "Report, 11 ncannot be taken as a complete 
expression of Mao's political outlook since it deals with 
5 
specific events and a very limited subject.n.5 This 11 Report, 11 
however, does give tangible evidence of Mao's theories on 
agrarian reform and will be discussed more fully when Mao's 
agrarian policies are examined. 
Mao's analysis of the classes in Chinese Society 
was contained in the article, 11 Analysis of the Classes in 
Chinese Society, 11 and was written in 1926, to combat two 
deviations existing in the Party. 6 The right wing which 
was under the leadership of Ch'en Tu-hsiu paid atten tion 
only to the Kuomintang Communist cooperation and the left 
wing under Chang Kuo-tao was interested only in the labor 
movement; both forgot the peasants. Although both wings 
were keenly aware of the insufficiency of the revolutionary 
forces, neither knew where to look for reinforcements and 
for broad masses of allies. In this article Mao indicated 
that in the peasantry the Chinese proletariat had its 
staunchest and most numerous ally, and thus solved the prob-
lem concerning the chief ally in the Chinese revolution.? 
Mao gave evidence that all past revolutions in China 
77. 
5Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank, Documentary History, 
6Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International 
Publishers, 4 Vols., 1954-1956), Vol. I, 13-20. Herein-
after cited as Mao, Selected Works . 
7Mao , Selected Works, Vol. I, 13 . 
6 
had achieved basically very little, because the revolution-
aries were unable to unite their real friends and attack 
their enemies. Thus, a basic concept in Mao's philosophy 
is the determination of who are friends and who are enemies. 
In applying this philosophy to the movement of the Commu-
nist Party in China Mao states in his Selected Works that 
"A revolutionary party is the guide of the masses, and no 
revolution ever succeeds when the revolutionary party leads 
it astray." 8 Mao's purpose of this analysis was to adjudge 
the value of each of the different classes of Chinese 
society with reference to the importance of each class to 
the Chinese Communist Party in its revolutionary movement. 
The analysis of the classes was made with regard to the 
economic status of the various class 0 s and of their respec-
tive attitudes towards the revolution and was designed to 
distinguish real friends from real enemies. The basic 
ideas of the report follow: 
I. The landlord and comprador classes-- In eco-
nomically backward and semi-colonial China the 
landlords and compradors are the complete 
vassals of the international bourgeoisie, 
depending upon imperialism for their existence 
and development. Mao feels this class repre-
sents the most backward and the most reaction-
ary production group in China and that it is 
this group which is hindering the development 
of her productive forces. 
8Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 13. 
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II. Middle class-- According to Mao this class 
represents China's capitalist production group 
in town and country. This class favors revolu-
tion only when it thinks it will profit from 
the revolution. Politically this class stands 
for the establishment of a state under the rule 
of a single class, the national bourgeoisie.~ 
III. Petty bourgeoisie-- It is Mao's opinion that 
on account of its size and class character, 
this class deserves the greatest attention. 
The group is composed of owner-peasants, master 
handicraftsmen and the petty intellectuals. 
In the petty intellectual faction are found the 
students, primary and middle school teachers, 
lower government functionaries, office clerks, 
small lawyers and petty traders. Although the 
various strata of this class have the same petty-
bourgeois economic status, they nevertheless fall 
into three different groups. 
1. Those who have some surplus grain and money. 
This group of people by their manual or 
mental labor, have an annual surplus over 
and above what they need for their own 
support. This is considered to be the 
right wing group of the petty bourgeoisie 
and is interested in gaining wealth and 
position. 
2. Those who are economically self-support-
ing. This is the largest of the three 
groups, comprising about half of the petty 
bourgeoisie. While they make enough money 
to support themselves they are unable to 
accumulate wealth. 
9while the landlord and comprador classes are 
national bourgeoisie, in Mao's opinion the greater crime 
rests in the fact that they are vassels of the international 
bourgeoisie. As members of this class, he feels that there 
is no hope of changing their reactionary thinking and bring-
ing them in line with the Chinese Communist Party. He 
therefore, uses the term national bourgeoisie to distinguish 
the middle class group that he feels will accept the think-
ing and principles of the Chinese Communist Party line. 
8 
3. Those whose standard of living is being re-
duced and who are finding, due to various 
circumstances, great difficulty in retaining 
their wealth and social position. This 
group constitutes the left wing of the petty 
bourgeoisie. 
IV. The semi-proletariat-- This class is divided into 
five categories: (1) the overwhelming majority of 
the semi-tenant peasants, (2) poor peasants, (3) 
handicraftsmen, (4) shop assistants and (5) ped-
lars. The economic status of this class plus the 
fact that it is exploited by the landlords and 
the middle class easily unites it with the revo-
lution. 
V. The proletariat-- At the time of this analysis 
this group consisted of only about two million 
people. It is Mao's opinion that while they 
should be the backbone of the revolution there 
must be ~~ditional forces gathered to be suc-
cessful.~ 
From this analysis it is Mao's conclusion that the 
warlords, the bureaucrats, the compradors, the big landlords 
and the reactionary section of the intelligentsia are 
enemies of the Chinese Communist Party and the revolution. 
The industrial proletariat is the leading force and the 
semi-proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie are the closest 
friends of the revolution. In regard to the middle class 
Mao thinks the right wing may become an enemy of the Party 
and the revolution while the left wing may become a friend 
of the Party and the revolutionary movement. If the left 
wing joins the Party it must be watched because it might 
lOMao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 13-20. 
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try to create confusion within the Party. 
During the period 1931-1934, there developed, within 
the Chinese Conn:nunist Party, two groups who were misusing 
or not following Party ideas. These two factions were 
causing many Party members to be misled. One group, the 
doctrinaries, denied the experience of the Chinese revo-
lution and denied the truth that Marxism-Leninism is not a 
dogma but a guide to action. The other, the empiricists, 
clung to their own fragmentary experiences and could neither 
understand the importance of theory for revolutionary prac-
tice nor see the whole revolutionary situation. In order to 
correct these lines of thought Mao's article, 11 On Practice, 11 
was written to expose from the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninist 
theory of lmowledge such subjectivist mistakes in the Party 
as doctrinairism and empiricism, especially doctrinairism. 11 
Mao believes that if a man is to do something suc-
cessfully he must understand the method by which his goal 
is reached and he must practice to reach this goal. Man, 
in the process of practice, sees only the phenomena of var-
ious things at the beginning, but as practice continues man 
is able to form perceptions and impressions. If this 
llMao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 282-297. American 
Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of the China Mainland 
Press, No. 194, October 13, 1952, 1-8-.- --
10 
process is continued man will be able to form concepts or 
draw conclusions that conform with logic. According to Mao, 
the viewpoint of practice is the first viewpoint in the 
theory of lmowledge of dialectical materialism. 12 
It is Mao's contention that the whole process of 
man's knowledge of a thing, conception, judgment and in-
ference constitutes a more important stage of rational 
lmowledge than the formation of perceptions and impressions. 
According to Mao, uThe real task of knowledge is to arrive 
at thought tbrough perception, at a gradual understanding of 
the internal contradictions of objective things, their laws 
and the internal relations of various processes, that is, at 
logical knowledge. nl3 Mao maintains that logical lmowledge 
reaches the wholeness and the internal relations of things; 
where perceptual knowledge concerns only the separate as-
pects. It discloses the internal contradictions of the 
surrounding world and makes it possible to grasp the de-
velopment of the surrounding world in its totality and in 
the internal relations between all aspects. 14 
Mao thinks that the question of knowledge is one of 
science. If one wishes to gain knowledge one must par-
ticipate in the practice of changing reality. Mao states 
12Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 282-285. 
13Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 285-286. 
14Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 286. 
that: 
The source of all knowledge lies in the per-
ception through man's physical sense organs 
of the objective world surrounding him; if a 
person denies such perception, denies direct 
experience, and denies personal participation 
in the practice of ch~ging reality, then he 
is not a materialist.l~ 
11 
According to Mao, there can be no knowledge without 
practice and he calls this theory the dialectical-materi-
alist process of knowledge arguing that it arises from the 
practice of changing reality. He attributes his basis for 
this theory to Marxist materialism. 16 
Mao's philosophical essay, 11 0n Contradiction, 11 was 
written as a companion-piece to II On Practice, 11 with the 
same object, that is, of combating the serious mistakes of 
doctrinairism existing in the Chinese Communist Party line 
at the time • 1 7 
In this essay Mao develops a philosophical theory 
which he calls materialist dialectics. This theory included 
some of Vladimir Ulianov 1 s (Nicholas Lenin) ideas from his 
theory called the law of essence of dialectics, but Mao made 
15Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 288. 
l6Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 286-288. 
17Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 13-53. American 
Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 202, 
August 15, 1952, 4-28 . Hereinafter cited as Consulate, 
Background, No. 202. 
12 
a number of changes and additions to the theory. 
It is Mao's philosophy that 11 the law of contradic-
tion in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, 
is the most basic law in materialist dialectics. n 1.B Mao 
maintains that in order to understand the law of materialist 
dialectics one must have some comprehension of the six major 
problems involved. Mao believes these problems to be: 
the two world outlooks; the universality of 
contradiction; the particularity of contra-
diction; the principal contradiction and the 
principal aspect of a contradiction; the 
identity and the struggle of the aspects of 
a contradiction; the role of antagonism in 
c ontradiction.1'1 
In the development of this theory it is Mao's concept 
that there have always been two views concerning the laws of 
the development of the world. The first, the metaphysical 
world outlook or the world outlook of vulgar evolutionism 
which consists of looking at the world from an isolated, 
static and one-sided viewpoint, regards all things in the 
world as being isolated from one another and forever change-
less. The cause of the increase or decrease or transplace-
ment does not lie inside things, but outside them, that is, 
18Mao Selected Works, Vol. II 1 13. Consulate, , 
Background, No. 202, 4. 
19Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 13. Consulate, 
Background, No. 202, 4. 
13 
propulsion by external forces. The metaphysical theory 
holds that all varieties of things in the world have re-
mained unchanged since the moment they came into being. 
Through this theory, according to Mao, the capitalists 
trace the causes of social development to conditions ex-
ternal to society, like geography and climate. It is Mao's 
contention that the metaphysicists could not explain the 
multiplicity of the qualities of things; nor can they ex-
plain the phenomenon of one quality changing into another 
because they naively seek outside the things themselves for 
the cause of their development and repudiate the theory ad-
vanced by the materialist-dialectics that it is the contra-
20 dictions inside things that cause their development. 
In opposition to the metaphysical world outlook, the 
materialist-dialectical world outlook advocates the study of 
the development of things from inside, from the relationship 
of a thing to other things. The materialist-dialectical 
theory holds that the development of things should be re-
garded as interconnected and interacting upon each ot her. 
Mao states that, "the basic cause of development of t hings 
does not lie outside but inside them, in their intern al 
20Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 13-15. Consulate, 
Background, No. 202, 4-5. 
contradictions. 1121 Mao feels that purely external causes, 
such as is put for th by the metaphysic a l theory, can onl y 
lead to t he mechanica l motion of things . The contr ad i ction 
which take s place inside a thing is t~e basic cause of its 
development. Relationships are secondary causes according 
to t he materialist-dialectical t heory. Thus, man should 
learn how to observe and analyze skilfully the movement of 
opposites in various things and, on the basis of such 
analysis, to find out various things and methods of solv-
. t d. . 22 mg con ra ictions. 
It is Mao's contention that universality or absolute-
ness of contradiction has a two-fold meaning. First, con-
tradiction exists in the process of the development of all 
things. Second, in the process of development of each 
thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end. 
Contradiction is the basis for simple forms of motion, and 
still more the basis of complex forms of motion. In setting 
down rules for the Chinese Communists, Mao indicated that 
they must master the following method of contradiction which 
was explained by Karl Marx. 
21Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 15. Consulate, 
Background, No. 202, 5. 
22Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 15-18. Consulate, 
Background, No. 202, 5-6. 
In his Capital Marx first analyses the 
simplest, most ordinary, fundamental, most 
common and everyday relation of bourgeois 
(commodity) society, a relation that is en-
countered billions of times, viz., the ex-
change of commodities. In this very simple 
phenomenon (in this 'cell' of bourgeois 
society) analysis reveals all the contra-
dictions (or the germs of all contradic-
tions) of modern society. The subsequent 
exposition shows us the development (both 
growth and movement) of these contradictions 
and of this society in the sum of its indi-
vidual parts, from its beginning to its end. 23 
15 
Mao contends this method must be mastered by the Chinese 
Communists so they can correctly identify and analyze the 
history and condition of the Chinese revolution as well as 
define its perspectives. 
Mao indicates that it is necessary to take into ac-
count the particular points of motion of matter, namely the 
qualitative difference between one 1 orm of motion and ot her 
forms. Any form of motion contains within itself its own 
particular contradiction and this contradiction constitutes 
the particular quality which distinguishes one thing from 
all other things. All forms depend upon one another a s well 
as differing from one another. A certain quality possessed 
by a form is determined by its own contradiction. This is 
true not only of nature, but also of society and of thought. 
23Karl Marx as quoted in; Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 
II, 22. Consulate, Background, No. 202, 8. 
16 
Hence, it would not be possible to develop a corrrrnon charac-
ter unless an individual character is developed first, be-
cause without individual character there can be no corrrrnon 
character. All individual characters exist only temporari-
ly, therefore they are relative. 24 
The two sides to the particularity of contradiction 
in Mao's philosophy are the principal contradiction and the 
principal aspect of a contradiction. In the process of de-
velopment there are many contradictions which exist. One 
of these contradictions is the principal contradiction 
whose existence and development determine or influence the 
existence and development of other contradictions. Accord-
ing to Mao, it is very important that all Conrrnunists under-
stand these two phases because the study of various con-
ditions of unevenness in the contradiction and the non-
principal contradictions, of the principal aspect and the 
non-principal aspects of a contradiction constitutes one of 
the important methods by which a revolutionary political 
party determines its political, military, strategic and 
tactical directives. 25 
24Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 22-35. Consulate, 
Background, No. 202, 8-13. 
25Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 35-42. Consulate, 
Background, No. 202, 13-16. 
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It is Mao's theory that the identity and struggle 
of the aspects of a contradiction can not exist unless the 
aspects in every case or process exclude each other, strug-
gle with each other and are opposed to each other. In 
carrying the idea further he contends that such contradic-
tory aspects are contained in the process of all things in 
the world and in human thought, and argues that a complex 
process contains more than one pair of opposites, while a 
simple process contains only one pair of opposites. This 
brings about the fact that various pairs of opposites are 
opposed to one another. By this method all things in the 
objective world and human thought are formed and impelled 
to move. But if this is true, there is an utter lack of 
identity, or unity and how can Mao s Leak of identity or 
unity? "The reason is that a contradictory aspect cannot 
exist in isolation. Without the other aspect which is op-
posed to it, each aspect loses the condition of its ex-
istence.1126 
The last thing to be considered in contradiction, 
according to Mao, is the role of antagonism. To Mao an-
tagonism is, 11 a form of struggle within a contradiction, 
26Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 43. Consulate, 
Background, No. 202, 16. 
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but not the universal form . n 27 This type of thing may exist 
between different classes or it may exist between political 
groups . Supposedly this antagonistic contradiction will 
disappear when a Communistic society is realized. 
In summary, it may be said that the law of contra-
diction or the law of unity of opposites is the basic law 
of nature and society and also the basic law of thought. 
This is the opposite of the metaphysical world outlook and 
is Mao's theory called materialist dialectic. 
2 7Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 49. Consulate, 
Background, No. 202, 20. 
CHAPTER II 
AGRARIAN POLICIES OF MAO TSE-TUNG 
Mao Tse-tung first differed from the strict Communist 
Party line in his concepts regarding agrarian policies. He 
thought China presented a different situation from those 
which had been present in previous Communist uprisings 
throughout the world. Mao created the peasant Soviets or 
Peasant Associations, with their primitive Communism Ln 
Hunan in 1927. The success of the Chinese Communist agrar-
ian program led by Mao must be viewed against the background 
of a collapsing agrarian economy and a Kuomintang retreat 
from the reality that the peasants were the major force in 
China. This retreat from reality was also present, at this 
time, among many of the leading members of the Communist 
Party and "Mao's greatest achievement was to secure recog-
nition of the peasant movements as the moving force of the 
Chinese Revolution rather than as phenomena of merely tem-
porary and tactical utility. 11 1 
Mao, as we have seen, without authority from the Cen-
tral Committee, organized the Peasant Associations in the 
1Mary C. Wright, 11 The Chinese Peasant and Communism, 11 
Pacific Affairs, XXIV (September, 1951), 262. Hereinafter 
cited as Wright, 11 The Chinese Peasant," Pacific Affairs. 
20 
Hunanese peasant movement and drew the peasants closer to 
his ideas. The result was the Autu_rnn Harvest Insurrection 
which was a revolt of the peasants against their poor 
standard of living. This was quickly suppressed by the 
Kuomintang army in 1927, but it convinced Mao that the an-
swer to a successful revolution in China rested with the 
peasant class. 
Even though it was not considered the true Party 
line nor even sanctioned by the Communist Party, Mao con-
tinued his agrarian movement. By 1930, the entire Cormnunist 
movement had been forced into the interior by the Kuomintang 
and by 1933, those who followed Mao constituted the only ef-
fective peasant or Communist movement in the country. They 
survived because they found the key to peasant support and 
control, land reform. They introduced land reform and a 
host of subordinate policies designed to mobilize the peas-
antry, improve agricultural production and secure its fruits. 
Since no other active Communist movement existed in China, 
the urban revolution having become nihil, Mao assumed the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. His leadership 
meant a basic shift in Party policy to the support of the 
peasants and was reflected in the changing composition of 
the Party membership. In 1926, only five per cent of the 
Chinese Communist Party members were peasants but by 1930, 
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the over-whelming majority were peasants and by 1951, more 
than eighty per cent of the six million Party members were 
of peasant origin. The importance of the peasant member-
ship can be fully understood when it is realized they hold 
key posts, from Mao on down. 2 It had long been argued by 
Mao that nwhoever wins the support of the peasants will win 
China; whoever solves the land question will win the peas-
ants. 11 3 It appears that at least for the time being Mao 
has the correct solution. 
Mao's 11 Report of an Investigation into the Peasant 
Movement in Hunantt was written in reply to criticisms made 
both inside and outside the Party against the peasants' 
revolutionary struggles in 1926 and 1927.4 Th.rough this 
report Mao attempted to make clear thA peasant situation 
and to justify the position he had taken in supporting them 
and called upon the Party to do the same. 
Mao spent thirty-two days in Hunan conducting his in-
vestigation. He said that he found the peasant situation 
quite different from the information given him by the gentry 
2wright, "The Chinese Peasant," Pacific Affairs, 258. 
3chao Kuo-chun , "Chinese Land Policies,n Current 
History, XX.IV (June, 1953), 339. 
4Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International 
Publishers, 4 vols. 1954-1956), Vol. I, 21-59. Hereinafter 
cited as Mao, Selected Works . 
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in Hankow and Changsha and believed that all kinds of argu-
ments against the peasant movements must be speedily righted. 
Many of the erroneous measures which had been taken by the 
revolutionary authorities concerning the peasant movements 
should be changed. He believed that the peasant movement 
was a colossal event and their assistance would be of great 
value to the revolution. He pointed out that the peasants 
could not be held in check forever and probably before too 
long they would break their chains and the resulting move-
ment would be so swift and violent that no power, however 
great would be able to suppress it. In Mao's thinking the 
Party had three alternatives in regard to the peasants which 
were, 11 To march at their head and lead them. Or to follow 
at their rear, gesticulating at them and criticising them. 
Or to face them as opponents. 115 
The peasant movement in Hunan was divided into two 
periods. The first period, which was a period of organiza-
tion was divided into two stages. During the first period 
there was a stage of underground activities and a stage of 
open activities. During this period the peasant associa-
tion was not large but their activities were fairly success-
ful. 
5Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 22. 
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During the second period of the peasant uprising 
the revolutionary movement took place. The size of the 
peasant association was greatly increased. The peasants 
fought a good battle but because of the lack of arms and 
supplies, they were unable to defeat the gentry forces sent 
by the government to suppress the rebellion. 
The peasants attacked as their main targets the local 
bullies, bad gentry and the lawless landlords, hitting in 
passing the patriarchal ideologies and institutions, cor-
rupt officials in the cities and evil customs in the rural 
areas. The peasant associations should have all the power 
necessary to improve the situation, their living standards 
and social conditions. 6 
For ages the people with the power had tyrannized 
over the peasants and trampled them underfoot; that was why 
the peasants rose in such a revolt. It was Mao's theory 
that the most formidable revolts and the most serious trou-
bles would invariably occur at places where the local 
bullies, bad gentry and the lawless landlords had been the 
most ruthless in their evil deeds. These points were made 
by Mao in his 11 Report.u In discussing the question of 
whether or not the peasants had gone too far in their revo-
lution Mao said: 11 a revolution was not the same as inviting 
6Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 23-26. 
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people to dinner, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, 
or doing fancy needle work; it could not be anything so re-
fined, so calm and gentle or so mild, kind, courteous, re-
strained and magnanimous. 11 7 To him, a revolution was an act 
of violence by which one class using all the strength and 
power it could muster would overthrow or try to overthrow 
another class. It was absolutely necessary for the peasants 
to use their maximum amount of power in attempting the revo-
lution. 
According to Mao in his "Report" the peasantry had 
achieved a revolutionary task which had been left unaccom-
plished for many years. However, he realized that not all 
of the peasants had taken part in accomplishing the task of 
the revolution. He pointed out that the peasantry consis-
ted of three sections--the rich peasants, the middle peas-
ants and the poor peasants. 8 The circumstances of the three 
sections differ, and so did their reactions to the revolu-
tion. 
The main force of the revolution in the countryside 
was the poor peasants. This group accepted very willingly 
the leadership of the Communist Party according to Mao. 
7Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 27. The virtues 
quoted were virtues of Confucious, as described by one of 
his disciples. 
8Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 29. 
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Throughout the period of underground organization and the 
period of open organization, the poor peasants gave their 
full support to the cause. The poor peasants were not afraid 
of losing anything because they had nothing to lose.9 
During the first period the middle peasants did not 
as a rule join the associations. They joined during the 
second period but were not very active in the support of 
the association. This group took the attitude of wait and 
see.lo 
A part of the rich peasants joined the association 
but after being admitted never worked for it enthusiastic-
ally as they could not see where they could benefit. Up to 
the time when Mao wrote his nReport 11 there were still many 
who had not joined the peasants' association. 
It was Mao 1 s theory that the Party should continue to 
lead the poor peasantry- in the revolutionary movement. The 
Party should educate the middle and rich class showing them 
that they would benefit just as much as the poor peasants. 
This was necessary if the revolution was to be successful. 
As has been pointed out before Mao thought that the peas-
antry must provide the Communist Party of China with the 
nucleus of their revolutionary forces. They would be the 
9Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 31. 
lOMao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 30-31. 
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vanguard of the revolution . 11 
Ac c ording to Mao's interpretation of the peasant 
movement in Hunan, fourteen great deeds had been performed 
by the organization of the peasants. 12 The first great 
deed was, of course, the organization of the peasants into 
the peasant association. This bound the peasants together 
in the common cause of improving their lot and it was by 
use of this association the peasants were able to dispose 
of local bullies and bad gentry as well as the corrupt 
government officials. 
The second deed performed by the movement was the 
dealing of political blows against the landlords. The aim 
of the association was to overthrow the power of the land-
lords and to foster the growth of the power of the peas-
ants . Such things as auditing of accounts, fining, con-
tributions, minor protests and major demonstrations were 
examples which Mao gave for dealing political blows to the 
landlords . 
Another point mentioned by Mao was the dealing of 
economic blows to the landlords. This was achieved by pre-
venting the shipping of grain out of the area, preventing 
hoarding and speculation and preventing the price of grain 
11Mao , Selected Works, Vol . I, 29-33 . 
1~ao , Selected Works, Vol . I, 33-59. 
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from rising. This was possible only through the coopera-
tion of the peasants and the association. Other methods to 
reduce the landlords income were also used. 
Overthrowing the landlords' armed forces and the 
building up of the peasants' armed forces was a fourth deed. 
It is necessary for the peasants to build up a strong army 
if they hope to succeed in the revolution. It has already 
been pointed out how Mao felt about revolution. He thought 
that if it would obtain the goal then it was necessary and 
just. 
The extension of political ag itation was another im-
portant deed. Mao stated that if ten thousand schools of 
law and political science had been opened; they could not 
have achieved so much in such a short time in politically 
educating the men and women, young and old, all the way 
into the remote corners of the country, as the peasant 
associations did. 
A point mentioned by Mao in the uReportn laid the 
basis for his agrarian program for he argued that the peas-
ants needed the cooperative movement. This had not been 
achieved but Mao contended it was necessary to prevent the 
merchants and landlords from taking advantage of the peas-
ants when they were marketing their products. 
Other deeds mentioned by Mao were the overthrowing 
of the feudal rule of the local bullies and bad gentry; 
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overthrowing of the political power of his excellency, the 
county magistrate and his baliffs; overthrowing the clan 
authority; the peasants' prohibitions; eliminating banditry; 
abolishing exorbitant levies; cultural movement, and the 
building of roads. These completed the fourteen deeds and 
this also completed Mao's "Report.n The "Report,n as men-
tioned, deals with specific events and cannot be taken as a 
complete expression of Mao's political outlook. It does, 
however, give some insight into Mao's theories and ideas on 
the peasantry and the use which should be made of them in 
the revolution. 
A short analysis of three of the classes in the 
rural areas has been given, but a discussion at this time 
of a document which Mao wrote in 193~, will show how he ana-
lyzed the classes of the rural areas in his effort to find 
a correct solution to the agrarian problem. 13 Mao used the 
five main divisions of Chinese Society in discussing the 
classes of the rural areas. The first group, the landlords, 
possess land and do not engage in labor but they exploit 
the peasants and take part in labor only as a means of sup-
plementing their income. Their exploitations are in the 
form of the collection of rent; besides that, they lend 
13Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, lJ8-l40. 
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money, hire labor, or engage in industrial or commercial 
enterprise. However, land rent from the peasants is their 
principal form of exploitation.14 
The second group, the rich peasants, normally pos-
sess land, but there are some who possess only a part of 
the land they farm and rent the remainder of their farm 
land. The rich peasants engage regularly in exploitation 
and, in many cases, their income from exploitation forms a 
major portion of their total income. 15 
The middle peasants, which make up the third class, 
hold varying degrees of ownership. The position of the 
middle peasants ranges from one of complete ownership of 
land on one hand to the renting of all their land on the 
other hand. In any case the middle oeasants always possess 
adequate tools and implements of their own. The middle 
peasants, as a group, do not regularly participate in any 
form of exploitation. 16 
The fourth class, the poor peasants, usually have to 
rent their land for cultivation; however, in a few cases 
they do own their land, but these are very rare. The poor 
peasants are exploited by the other classes and are usually 
ll.i-Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 138. 
1.5Mao ' Selected Works, Vol. I, 139. 
16Mao ' Selected Works, Vol. I, 139. 
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forced to sell part of their labor in order to make a living. 
The fact that they have to sell part of their labor is the 
main criterion for distinguishing the middle peasants from 
the poor peasants . 17 
According to Mao the fifth class is composed of the 
workers and farm laborers who make their living wholly or 
principally by selling their labor power. By this analysis 
Mao hoped that he and the Party could better cope with the 
agrarian problem. 18 The peasantry provided Mao with the 
nucleus for his revolutionary army and by the program of 
land reform he hoped to satisfy the basic grievances of the 
bulk of the peasantry. The Chinese Communists found they 
had to teach the peasants how to carry on the class struggle 
because, according to their explanation, 11 most peasants 
lacked class consciousness and did not realize the landlords 
were their class enemies whom they must hate and fight with-
out mercy. 1119 
On July 1, 1949, in Corrnnemoration of the Twenty-
eighth Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao 
17Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 140. 
18 Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, l40. 
19Theodore His-en Chen, Chinese Communism and the 
Proletarian-Socialist Revolution (Los Angeles: University 
of Southern California Press, 1955), 6. 
delivered his speech, 11 The People's Democratic Die ta tor ship . n2 0 
According to the speech Mao feels a major problem facing the 
Chinese Communists is the peasants• scattered economy. Mao's 
answer to this problem is the socialization of agriculture 
because without the socialization of agriculture there can 
be no complete and sound realization of socialism. Sociali-
zation of great industry and labor as well as agriculture 
must be brought about and they must be backed by national 
enterprise. Mao c ontends a nation under democratic dic-
21 
tatorship by the people must solve these problems . 
To solve these problems of the peasants' economy Mao 
has brought and is bringing about sweepL~g reforms in his 
a grarian policies. These are aimed at increasing the pro-
duction, efficiency and socialization of agriculture. In 
1950, a Land Reform Law was passed by the Central People's 
Government abolishing the land ownership system of the upper 
class and calling for rather moderate treatment of rich and 
middle peasants . Other regulations passed at this time were 
the Agrarian Reform Law, the Decisions Concerning the 
2 0Mao Tse-tung, "The People's Democratic Dictator-
ship, tt Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 
Vol. 95, Par t 7, 9345-9348. Hereinafter cited as Mao, 
11 Dictatorship , 11 Congressional Record , Vol. 95 . 
2lJ.1.1a o, "Dictatorship, 11 Congressional Record, Vol. 
95 , 9347. 
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Differentiation of Class Status and the Regulations Govern-
ing the Organization of Peasants' Association. 22 
The Organization of the Peasants I Associations is an 
important step in Mao's agrarian program of collective agri-
culture. These associations were organized in the following 
manner: 
Under these regulations a team of three or 
four trained cadres would enter a village and 
talk with various peasants, gathering information. 
Then they would hold a series of mass meetings at 
which the government's determination to expropri-
ate the land and possessions of the "landlords" 
was explained to the assembled throng. The peas-
ants were urged to speak out their bitterness. 
A few selected "landlords" were displayed before 
the shouting mob, and 11 witnesses 11 hastened to 
relate their "crimes. 11 The People's Tribunal 
would pass sentence on the victims. Meanwhile, 
under the direction of the cadres, the village 
adults would meet to determine the ''class statusn 
of each local citizen, determined according to a 
detailed series of regulations drawn by the 
government. Landlords lost all of their property, 
rich peasants part of their property and so forth. 
Finally the redistribution would begin, including 
buildings, tools, stored grain, and farm animals. 
The cadres would utilize the "enlightened ele-
mentsu to form a Village or Peasant Association, 
sponsor Women's organizations and recruit poten-
tial members for the Youth League. A village 
militia, responsible to the party and the army, 
would be organized to carry out the sentences 23 11 demanded" by the assembled "Village Congress. 11 
22 Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. 
Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism 
(Canibridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), 
276. 
23Richard L. Walker, "Collectivization in China: A 
Story of Betrayal, 11 Problems of Comrn.unism, IV ( January-
February, 1955), 4. Hereinafter cited as Walker, "Collec-
tivization, 11 Problems of Communism. 
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In the next phase of the collectivization movement 
"mutual aid teams 11 were organized based on the Chinese prac-
tice of pooling labor during the busy season. After these 
were under way they were placed under the direction of the 
cadres. By this method they were converted into permanent 
mutual aid teams and were organized for the accomplishment 
of other tasks during the slack season. These were to be 
used as the stepping stones to higher forms of collectivi-
zation in agriculture. The higher forms of collectivization 
in agriculture are as follows: 
(1) Agricultural producer's cooperatives--The 
key development from the point of view of 
collectivization. These are owned by the 
member peasants. 
(2) Collectivized farms--These are owned by 
the collective as a unit. 
(3) State farms--These are owned by the state 
and manned by the peasants working for 
wages. 
(4) Machine tractor stations--These are state 
owned units ~hich farm out tractors to 
collectives. 4-
The events which led to these policies on the agrar-
ian problem occurred during the period from 1945-1950. 
After the completion of World War II the Cow.munists found 
themselves in a favorable position to resume their theory 
24walker, "Collectivization, 11 Problems of Communism, 
8. 
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of class struggle . The Party found the masses were not 
effectively organized and the goals which they hoped to 
reach could not be reached if this type of mass confusion 
was allowed to continue. This made it necessary that a 
Party line be developed in relation to the agrarian move-
ment so that the force of the peasantry could be mobilized 
to bring about better discipline in the Party and greater 
production of products. In the development of this line a 
number of Party directives to cope with the situation were 
issued by Mao. Out of these directives grew the collectivi-
zation movement. 25 
According to a survey made by the Human Resources 
Research Institute of Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, in 
1955, this program had contributed nothing to the financial 
position of the peasants. This report contends that due to 
the rise in agricultural taxes, the exacting of donations 
and contributions the peasants of China have not been able 
to build up any savings. It is the contention of this re-
port that the future development of farm economy in Commu-
ist China will depend largely on the adequacy of the help 
of the government and on the attitudes of the peasants to-
wards the obviously collectivistic tendencies of government 
25shao-er Ong, Agrarian Reform in Communist China to 
1952 (Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force Personnel 
and Training Research Center, July, 1955), 17-19. 
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· lt 1 · . 26 agricu ure po icies. 
On July 31, 1955, Mao called for the socialization of 
the agricultural program to be intensified and to be carried 
to a greater degree. The results of this directive is the 
commune system which is now being used in Communist China. 
When Mao gave his speech calling for this movement, he made 
it plain that the Chinese Communist Party had encountered 
resistance in their program to put all Chinese peasants into 
agricultural producer cooperatives.27 According to Mao, these 
resistances stemmed partly from doubts and uncertainties in 
the minds of certain cadres concerning the wisdom of the 
Party's cooperativization program as well as the Party's 
ability to carry it out, and partly from the fact that some 
20 to 30 per cent of the peasants who ar comparatively 
well-to-do are opposed to further socialization of agri-
culture. It is Mao's contention that the program is meet-
ing with some difficulty because the Party is not supplying 
the leadership which is necessary to carry through a program 
26shao-er Ong, Chinese Farm Economy After Agrarian 
Reform (Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force Personnel 
and Training Research Center, August, 1955), 7-9. 
27American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current 
Background, No. 364, October 19, 1955, 1-11. Hereinafter 
cited as Consulate, Background, No. 364. 
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such as this. 28 Mao told the Party members that this is a 
large scale Socialist revolutionary movement with more than 
500 million of the rural population involved, and it will 
have great world significance. It is the duty of the Party 
members to lead this movement, and not resort to various 
ways to hold it back. There are bound to be deviations in 
the course of promotion of the movement, but these are 
understandable and easily corrected. The defects and mis-
takes among cadres and peasants will be overcome or correc-
ted as long as the Party actively assists them. The cadres 
and peasants are progressive, and the movement is basically 
healthy under the correct leadership of the Party. It is 
Mao's contention that the Party members have confidence in 
the masses and they must have confidence in the Party's 
ability to lead. According to Mao, if the Party members 
doubt these two basic truths they shall achieve nothing.29 
Mao does not want cooperatives created just for the 
sake of making more cooperatives. He is opposed to the 
tendency to disregard quality but to merely seek figures in 
the development of cooperatives and households joining them. 
For this reason he insists that there must be a reorganization 
28American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current 
Background, No. 367, November 14, 1955, 1. 
29consulate, Background, No. 364, 1-4. 
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procedure carried on many times a year that will make it 
possible to let these consolidated cooperatives lead those 
awaiting consolidation in a movement of gradual collectivi-
zation and to do away with the tendency of rushing into a 
job or a task without first laying basic plans for the com-
pletion of the specific project which is being undertaken. 
Furthermore, the Party must treasure any small bit of socia-
list enthusiasm on the part of the peasants, and the cadres, 
and not check it. It, therefore, becomes the duty of a Party 
member to move simultaneously with members of the coo pera-
tives, cadres of cooperatives, and cadres of the hsien ,30 
chu31 and hsiang32 levels, and they must not snap their 
positive enthusiasm. As long as any part of a cooperative 
is functioning well and its members or at least part of its 
members are working together, it is to be continued.33 
Mao feels that if this program is to succeed the 
Party must be fully prepared to put all their energy and 
efforts into the construction of socialized agriculture. 
He feels that there is a considerable amount of work to be 
30Hsien--A province in China. 
3lchu--A district in China. 
32Hsiang--A village in China 
33Consulate, Background, No. 364, 4-5. 
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done if a number of new agricultural producer cooperatives 
are to be built. This consists of: 
(1) The criticism of mistaken ideologies, the 
summing up of work experiences. 
(2) The systematic and repeated propagation of 
the principles, policies and measures of 
our Party on agricultural cooperatives. 
In carrying out propaganda among the peas-
ants, not only must we explain the bene-
fits of cooperativization, but we must also 
point out the difficulties to be encountered 
in the process of cooperativization so that 
the peasants may be fully prepared spirit-
ually for them. 
(3) On the basis of actual conditions, there 
must be made overall plans for the develop-
ment of agricultural cooperativization. 
(4) The training, through short term courses, 
of cadres for the operation of cooperatives. 
(5) The universal and large scale development 
of agricultural production mntual aid 
teams, and where possible, the promotion 
of federations of mutual aid teams to lay 
the foundation for their further union in 
building of cooperatives.34 
In the implementation of this program Mao stresses 
that only those who are active and interested in the pro-
gram should be organized. It is his opinion that these 
people will further the cause of his program and the ad-
vantages such as, special privileges and use of machinery, 
which those who have not joined the movement can see and 
34consulate, Background, No . 364, 5. 
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this will serve to unite them with it without the use of 
force. In other words, if the people are shown the advan-
tages of the cooperatives in agriculture they would not 
have to be forced to join but would join of their own free 
will, and thus there would be no problem. Mao thinks the 
broad masses are willing, under the leadership of the Party 
to march gradually on the road of Socialism and the Party 
is capable of leading the peasants on the road of Socialism. 
These two points are basic aspects in the carrying out of 
this program. If the Communist Party of China lacks such 
confidence it cannot, according to Mao, hope to build up a 
Socialist China in the period of three Five Year Plans. It 
is Mao I s hope that in the span of three Five Year Plans 
China can reach some semblance of Socialism in both agri-
culture and industry. Mao indicates that the Communist 
Party of China is now engaged in carrying on two revolu-
tions, one in the area of changing the social system from 
private ownership into public ownership and the other in 
the carrying out of the technical revolution of chang ing 
handicraft production to large scale modern mechanized pro-
duction. It is Mao's belief that it is very fundamental 
that all Party members realize that the two revolutions are 
joined together.35 
35consulate, Background, No. 364, 7-9. 
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This policy which was adopted by Mao in allowing 
only those who were active in the support of the coopera-
tives led to some confusion in the movement. The develop-
ment of the cooperatives failed to interest many of the 
peasantry who did not join them and this led to a stricter 
policy of enforcement. This is the stage which China is 
presently going through. The Communist Party has organized 
the cooperatives into a group of larger organs called com-
munes. The Party members under the leadership of Mao came 
forth with the concept that the socialization stage was not 
moving rapidly enough and therefore, it was necessary to 
introduce another idea. This is the concept that Communist 
China must advance by 11 leapsn rather than a slower pace to-
wards their goals. While one cooperativ€ had from 100 to 
2,000 households represented, the size of the new commune 
ranges from 5,000 to 10,000 households. It is Mao's in-
tention that the commune not only expands the scope of the 
original agricultural cooperative, but also changes its 
nature. By the introduction of the commune Mao hopes to be 
able to make better use of the tremendous labor which is 
present in China. This has been a problem because of the 
deranged population, but by uniting them in large groups in 
particular areas it is hoped that the labor potential can 
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be realized.36 
The backbone of Mao's revolutionary movement is the 
peasant. It appears that by the use of the commune in 
bringing about industrialized society in China, Mao hopes 
to transform the peasants into an industrial proletariat. 
He contends that the industrial proletariat is necessary 
for a Corfilaunist revolution to be completely successful. 
Since the original industrial proletariat in China was small 
in comparison to its huge population Mao must develop 
through such measures as the communes a larger industrial 
proletariat. 
36Arnerican Consulate General, Hong Kong , Current 
Background, No. 524, October 21, 1958, 1-5. Hereinafter 
cited as Consulate, Background, No. 524. 
CHAPTER III 
LABOR POLICIES OF MAO TSE-TUNG 
Although Mao Tse-tung 1 s revolution was spearheaded 
by the peasantry, he now seeks to inflate the role of the 
laboring class, or the industrial proletariat as it is 
known in Communist society, in the achievement of the revo-
lution. This does not mean Mao is deserting the peasantry. 
Mao is trying to convert the peasantry into the same status 
as that of the industrial proletariat by the use of communes. 
At least this appears to be one of the motives behind the 
introduction of the communes according to reports coming out 
of Communist China at this time. Mao hopes to achieve a 
large industrial proletariat which is dependent on the 
government for its living and at the same time be a sup-
porting factor in any program which the government wants to 
carry out. 1 
It is Mao's theory that democratic dictatorship by 
the people re~uires the leadership of the labor class, be-
cause, he believes, only the labor class would have the 
sense of thorough revolution. Mao has advanced the idea of 
labor as the focal point of the revolution and he is 
lBased upon the publications of the American Con-
sulate General at Hong Kong . 
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embarking on the road of industrializing China. Because of 
China's predominantly peasant population and the lack of an 
important urban working class the Communist Party must lead 
the Chinese nation through an interim 11 bourgeois capitalist 11 
period of unknown duration . 2 
The basis for the labor phase of the Communist revo-
lution, just as with the ag rarian phase, starts in the 
1920 1 s. In 1928, the condition of China's laboring class 
was very poor and labor during this period was divided into 
four main classes. First, the independent workers who 
worked on a small scale for their own livelihood and sold 
their finished products directly to the consumer averaging 
from twelve to fourteen hours a day on the job. Second, the 
industrial laborers who worked in the fact 0ries and was com-
posed of two factions. One faction was employed by the 
Chinese Government and spent nine to twelve hours a day in 
the factories. The other was employed in private factories 
with a work day of ten to sixteen hours. Third, the agri-
cultural laborers of China who constituted a larg e majority 
of the labor class in China during this period and worked 
from twelve to eighteen hours a day. Fourth, the Coolie 
2Mao Tse-tung, 11 The People I s Democratic Dictatorship, n 
Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 95, 
Part 7, 9347. Hereinafter cited as Mao, 11 Dictatorship, n 
Congressional Record, Vol. 95. 
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laborers who were of the lowest caste and earned a bare sub-
sistance wage for around eighteen hours work a day. This 
system presented another area for Communist agitation but 
the labor population at this time was very small preclud-
ing great seccess with labor groups at this time.3 
In a resolution written for the Chinese Communist 
Party between 1939 and 1941, Mao discusses the role of the 
industrial proletariat (labor) in the revolutionary move-
ment.4 It is Mao's theory that the Chinese proletariat 
should understand that although it is the class with the 
highest political sense of organization it cannot win vic-
tory by virtue of its own strength. To make victory pos-
sible the proletariat must unite, under various conditions, 
with all possible revolutionary classes and strata and organ-
ize a revolutionary united front. To answer the question 
of why the proletariat should form a united front with other 
groups, Mao points out that the size of the group compared 
with the whole of China makes it impossible to carry on the 
revolution without uniting with other groups. 5 
3s. K. Sheldon Tos, "Present Labor Conditions in 
China," Monthly Labor Review, XXVI (April, 1928), 742. 
4Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International 
Publishers, 4 Vols., 1954-1956), Vol. III, 93-95. Herein-
after cited as Mao, Selected Works. 
5Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 93-95. 
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In this resolution Mao maintains the basic good quali-
ties of the proletariat are that it is associated with the 
most advanced form of economy, it has a strong sense of 
organization and discipline and it owns no private means of 
production. In addition to the b as ic g ood qualities of t he 
Chinese proletariat, Mao also argues that t hey have many 
outstanding qualities. He contends that the proletariat 
have been subjected to three fold oppress ion, oppression by 
imperialism, by the bourgeoisie and by the feudal forces, 
with a severity and ruthlessness rarely found in most na-
tions of the world. Consequently, the Chinese proletariat 
is more resolute and more thoroughgoing in the revolution-
ary struggle than any other class. Since there is no such 
economic basis for social reformism in c c lonial and semi-
colonial China the proletariat is a very revolutionary group 
as a whole. 
Since its appearance on the scene the Chinese prole-
tariat has been under the leadership of its own revolution-
ary political party, the Chinese Communist Party, and has 
become the most politically conscious class in Chinese so-
ciety . Mao maintains that in spite of unavoidable weak-
nesses such as size, age and cultural level the Chinese pro-
letariat has nonetheless become the basic motivating force 
of the Chinese revolution. He contends that the Chinese 
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revolution cannot succeed without the leadership of the 
proletariat because earlier examples of revolutionary move-
ment in China have proved this to be true. He cited both 
the revolution of 1911, and the revolution of 1924 to 1927 
as examples to prove this belief. He claims the proletar-
iat did not consciously participate in the 1911 movement 
and that the movement of the 20's, failed because the big 
bourgeoisie betrayed its alliance with the proletariat by 
abandoning the common revolutionary program and also because 
the Chinese proletariat and its political party still lacked 
ample revolutionary experience. Since the proletariat was 
abandoned by the bourgeoisie Mao argues that it is necessary 
for the proletariat to unite with a class on which it can 
depend for support, and he maintains thPt among all the 
classes in Chinese society, the peasantry is the firm ally 
of the working class, while the urban petty bourgeoisie is 
a reliable ally and the national bourgeoisie is an ally in 
certain periods and to a certain extent. He cites the fact 
that the Chinese proletariat is largely made up of bankrupt 
peasants, and since this is true it has natural ties with 
the vast peasantry, which will facilitate their close al-
liance.6 
The adoption of an urban policy by the Chinese 
6Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 93-96. 
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Communist Party became necessary , in 1948, when the Com-
munist army b ecame an organized group. The Communists 
needed to keep the cities from being destroyed and the fac-
tories running so they could carry on the revolutionary 
movement against the Nationalists under the leadership of 
Chiang Kai-shek . The following policy was outlined by Mao 






Troops were especially briefed on the po-
litical, military, and ideological neces-
sity for keeping the cities alive , and 
special disciplinary regulations were for-
mulated and disseminated to inspire troops 
to observe an exemplary conduct. 
Special proclamations to the citizenry 
within besieged cities were extensively 
broadcast to prescribe the course of con-
duct incumbent upon them, to offer assur-
ances of Ptersonal safety for all but 11 wRr 
criminals t and other objecti,re elements, 
and to promise personal safety and re-
w~rds for those who protected installa-
tions destruction or sabotage. 
These special proclamations were stand-
ardized in the latter phases of the 1949 
campaign by a point procle.mation of Mao 
Tse-tung and Chu Teh, broadcasts prior to 
the capture of cities and widely dissemi-
nated by radio, wall-board, newspapers and 
other media as a statement of basic pol-
icy after their occupation. 
Iimnediately after the Comm~u1ist forces 
entered the city, a special lfmilitary 
control commission11 was established under 
military Auspices to prepare for the re -
establishment of civilian government . 
Finally at an appropriate tii--ne, the 11 peo-
ple.1 s 11 or ttdemoc r atic" government was 
proclaimed within each city. It was in-
itially to work hand in hand with the 
military control commission or its agent 
in support of military policy, but was 
eventually to assume complete local au-
thority with the disbandment of the mili-
tary control commission.7 
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In 1949, Mao established a legal basis for the use 
of corrective labor which served Mao both as a means of eco-
nomic exploitation and a weapon for political coercion and 
also re-education. This was provided in article nine of 
the Common program, which specified the performance of 
npublic service" as one of the duties of all citizens of 
the People's Republic. 8 
In June, 1950, the Trade Union Law of the People's 
Republic was put into force. The object of this law was to 
define precisely the legal status, func , ions and obliga-
tions of the trade union organizations under the new demo-
cratic regine and to enable the working class to become 
better organized so it can play its due part in the new 
democratic reconstruction. In order to protect the funda-
mental interests of the working class, trade unions were 
specifically directed to: 
7H. A. Steiner, "Chinese Communist Urban Policy, n 
American Political Science Review, XLIV (March, 1950), 
55-56. 
8Karl A. Wittfogel, 11 Forced Labor in Communist 
China," Problems of Communism, V (July-August, 1956), 34. 
(a) organize and educate the masses of workers. 
(b) establish a new attitude towards labour, 
observe labour discipline and organize 
output competitions and other production 
movements. 
(c) protect public property in nationalized 
and co-operative enterprises and in in-
stitutions and schools. 
(d) promote the policy of developing pro-
duction for the benefit of both labour 
and capital in private enterprises and 
oppose violations of Government decrees. 9 
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An indication Mao is turning to labor for support 
to continue his Communistic movement appeared in 1949, 
when Li Li-san, who was the leader of the urban Communist 
from 1928-1930, but was dismissed by the Comintern because 
he failed to achieve urban organization, was brought back 
into the Party ranks. Li admitted the Mao line of lying 
low in the cities in the early phase of the Communist move-
ment had been correct and his policy of trying to org anize 
an urban revolt during the early period had been wrong.lo 
It is apparent Mao is now (July, 1959) in complete command 
of Communist Party strategy and tactics. It also seems 
that Mao is energetically seeking to build up his indus-
trial proletariat. 
9 11 Trade Union Law of the People I s Republic of China, 11 
Industry and Labour, IV (October 15, 1950), 366. 
1~ew York Times, November 30, 1949, 19. 
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Mao's concept of labor's role in the revolution is 
probably best indicated in his speech, given on July 1, 
1949, in commemoration of the twenty-eighth anniversary of 
the Chinese Communist Party entitled, 11 The People I s Demo-
cratic Dictatorship, 1111 in which he states: 
Our e.rperiences focus on one 'Ooint. It is the 
democratic dictatorship by the people based on the 
unity of labor and peasantry and led by labor 
through the Communist Party. This dictatorship 
must unite with the international revolutionary 
forces. In the era of imperialism, no othe11 class 
in any country can lead any genuine revolution 
to victory. This is our formula. This is our 
principal experience. This is our main politi-
cal point.12 
The significance of the communes and their relation-
ships to industry and labor can be examined on two levels, 
the practical level and the theoretical level. In consider-
ing the practical level, the commune appears to be intended 
as an appropriate answer to a number of difficulties which 
have confronted the Communists in the attempt to carry out 
socialist construction in China. One of the most formid-
able of these has been the government's failure to control 
the movement of labor between the countryside and towns. 
Of course, the industrialization of China requires that the 
largest number of workers be drawn from the rural areas 
llMao, "Dictatorship, 11 Congressional Record, Vol. 
95, 934.5-9348. 
12Mao, "Dictatorship, 11 Congressional Record, Vol. 
9.5, 9 34 7. 
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into industry, but owing to the frequent revisions of plans 
and the difficulties of estimating labor requirements, 
there has been a tendency for peasants attracted by hopes 
of better conditions of life than in the villages, to mi-
grate to the towns in numbers far in excess of what is 
needed, resulting in large-scale urban unemployment. Since, 
in the average commune, an urban center will be combined 
with surrounding villages in a single economic unit, it should 
be easier for the communists to regulate and harness the 
available force within the commune. The commune also has 
its advantages for a policy which seeks to combine a de-
centralized socialist economy with central political con-
troi.13 The urban people's communes are set up in cities 
mainly for the purpose of acceleratin~ the pace of socialist 
construction now and to create suitable conditions for grad-
ually passing over to Communism in the future. It is neces-
sary, therefore, according to recen~ Party directives, that 
the central link in the chain of consolidation and elevation 
of urban people's communes should consist in developing 
production and building a powerful material base. 14 
13American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Extracts 
From China Mainland Magazines, No. 161, March 16, 1959, 
~3. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of 
China Mainland Press, No . 1965, March 4, 1959, 4-5. 
Hereinafter cited as Consulate, Survey. 
14consulate, Survey, No. 1965, 4. 
The Party has found from their experience in setting 
up people's cormnunes in many areas that there are many 
favorable conditions for developing production in the cities. 
The economic strength of state-owned factories, enterprises 
and schools are powerful enough to aid the development of 
commune production. Meanwhile, the commune production con-
sists mainly in socialist commodity production; production 
is fast, profits are greater, development is rapid and 
technical conditions are better. The production policy of 
urban people's communes should be: 
to serve st a te industry, a gricultu ral pro-
duction and people's livelihood in cities; to 
suit local conditions, obtain materials locally 
and rely on the masses; to run communes industri-
ously and thriftily and gradually build the 
material base for commlll)es with the aid and sup-
port of state economy.l~ 
The industrial production of the communes of the ur-
ban area in Communist China at the present time takes the 
fallowing farms: 
(1) Commune-run factories. The factories or-
ganize production of desired articles, tak-
ing into account the needs of state indus-
try, obtaining materials locally, utilizing 
waste products and materials, and main-
taining direct contact with state factories 
and work sites. The products are sold 
either through commercial departments or 
by the communes themselves. 
l.5consulate, Survey, No. 196.5, 4. 
(2) Production to serve large factories and 
enterprises. The commune-run factories 
are organized to meet the needs of large 
factories and enterprises or to do pro-
cessing jobs for state-owned factories, 
enterprises and commercial departments 
under processing contracts. 
(3) Service production. For instance, tailor-
ing, shoe making, dry cleaning, dyeing, 
etc. are organized to meet the people's 
daily needs. 
(4) Agricultural and subsidiary production 
and processing of foods to ins:IBe supply 
of non-staple foods to cities. 
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To develop commune production, a mass movement is 
being launched for finding production outlets in every pos-
sible area and expand multiple production. According to a 
Party directive, existing facilities and waste materials 
must be fully utilized. A technical revolution must take 
place to insure progress by transferring from crude methods 
to modern methods and from handicraft to mechanization in 
order to raise production. 17 
In order to further develop commune production, the 
Party is incorporating commune production into state plans 
so as to avoid a situation in which certain units some-
times cannot carry on normal production because of the lack 
of raw materials. At the same time, existing small plants 
16consulate, Survey, No. 1965, 4-5. 
17consulate, Survey, No. 1933, Jan. 14, 1959, 8. 
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of the same nature are being merged into larger plants on 
the principle of facilitating production, leadership, and 
the gradual transition from collective ownership to owner-
18 ship by the entire people. 
It is the Communist Party's desire and goal to see 
the urban people's communes as unified organizers of pro-
duction, exchange, distribution and people's living amenities, 
and as a social organization to combine workers, peasants, 
traders, students and soldiers and merge government and 
communes. 19 
18consulate, Survey, No. 1965, 5-6. 
19consulate, Survey , No . 1965, 10. 
CHAPTER IV 
MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
According to Mao Tse-tung, anyone directing a war 
must study and solve the problem of the laws of war. Con-
sequently, it becomes necessary for anyone directing a war 
to understand the conditions of that particular war. Mao 
contends that everyone knows that, in doing a thing, if one 
does not understand its circumstances, then one cannot know 
its laws or how to deal with it. These are some of Mao's 
basic concepts of war which were adopted as the correct 
views on war strategy in 1935 by the Chinese Connnunist Party. 
He maintains that, ttwar is the highest form of struggle, 
existing ever since the emergence of pr ivate property and 
social classes, for settling contradictions between classes, 
between nations, between states, or between political 
groups at given stages of their development. 111 Unless there 
is an understanding of the circumstances of war, its char-
acteristics and its relations to other things, Mao argues 
that it is not possible to :!mow the laws of war nor is it 
possible to direct a war to win a victory. According to 
Mao's theory on the problem of war the difference in the 
1Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International 
Publishers, 4 Vols., 1954-1956), Vol. I, 176. Hereinafter 
cited as Mao, Selected Works. 
56 
circumstances of war determines the difference in the guid-
ing laws of war. There is a difference of time, of place 
and of character. Mao is opposed to the mechanical approach 
to war because the laws of war in each historical stage 
have their own individual characteristics. Revolutionary 
war and counter-revolutionary war have their own character-
istics and, in reference to place, each nation or state has 
its own peculiarities. Therefore, a study of the laws of 
war of different historical stages, of different character-
istics, of different places, is necessary for each war. 2 
One of Mao's fundamental beliefs in the military 
area is that wherever there are military operations, there 
is a whole military situation. This military situation may 
cover the world, a nation or an indepe1jent area, but wher-
ever there are various phases and stages to be taken into 
consideration there is a whole military operation. Mao in-
dicates the task of strategy is to study the laws for di-
recting operations that may affect a whole military situa-
tion and the task of operational or tactical direction is 
to study the laws for directing military operations which 
are of a partial character. A comprehension of the whole 
makes it easier for one to handle a particular part of a 
2Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 175-179. 
situation. The whole situation consists of all the parts 
and no part can become independent. The relationship be-
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tween the whole and the parts holds not only between war strat-
egy and operational strategy, according to Mao, but it also 
is true between operational direction and tactics. He fur-
ther argues that the main thing is to center attention on the 
important links which have a bearing on the whole situation, 
therefore, a basic task in studying strategic problems is 
to achieve the aim of solving all the important problems of 
a war or operation.3 
Mao maintains that learning is no easy matter, but to 
apply the knowledge one has acquired is even more difficult. 
Mao admits that he cannot ask for an invincible general, 
but he does ask for a general who is bot~ brave and wise, 
who usually wins battles in the course of a war and who com-
bines wisdom with courage. He thinks that in order to at-
tain the combination of wisdom and courage, there is a meth-
od which must be mastered and this method is to be employed 
in learning as well as in applying what has been learned. 
Mao contends that it is necessary to become familiar with 
the problems which confront the enemy, as well as those 
which confront his own forces. By the use of the knowledge 
3Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 180-183. 
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of lmowing the whole situation one can better formulate 
military plans. Since most military laws and theories 
represent knowledge which has been gained from past exper-
ience it is necessary to study them, but Mao argues that it 
is also important to put the conclusions reached to tests 
of experience. In other words, practice is more important 
than study in the process of learning war strategy.4 
It is Mao's contention that the Chinese Cormnunist 
Party must work hand in hand with the industrial proletariat 
in order to bring about a complete revolutionary victory in 
China. He thinks the masses of the Chinese peasantry and 
the urban petty bourgeoisie are willing to take an active 
part in the revolutionary movement and bring it to victory 
if they have the proper leadership. This leadership, ac-
cording to Mao, must come from the Chinese Communist Party 
and the industrial proletariat. To further this point Mao 
argues that of all the social groups and political groups 
in semi-colonial China, only the proletariat and the Com-
munist Party are open-minded and politically far-sighted 
enough to apply what they have learned in carrying on the 
revolutionary movement. Mao maintains that the Cormnunist 
revolution of China is not only for its liberation, but 
4Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 183-187. 
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also has great significance for world revolution. It is, 
therefore, necessary that the Party give its fullest support 
and its most capable leadership to the revolutionary cause. 
The Party must strive to overcome the harmful tendencies 
that endanger the revolution and try to establish the cor-
rect line so that complete victory will be possible.5 
In discussing the revolutionary war of China Mao 
feels it is necessary to understand the character of this 
struggle. Failure to understand the characteristics of this 
revolutionary movement means inability to direct it or lead 
it to victory. According to Mao's interpretation there are 
four main characteristics of the Chinese revolutionary 
movement. The basic ideas of these characteristics are 





The first is that China is a vast semi-
colonial country which is unevenly de-
veloped both politically and economically, 
and which has gone through the revolution 
of 1924-7. 
The second characteristic is the great 
strength of the enemy. 
The third characteristic is that the Red 
Army is weak and small. 
The fourth characteristic is the Communist 
Party 1 s 61eadership and the agrarian revo-lution. 
5Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 188-192. 
6Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 193-196. 
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Mao maintains that the first characteristic basically 
determines both the political strategy and tactics and the 
military strategy and tactics of the Chinese Communists . At 
the time of this analysis the Kuomintang Party was in control 
of key positions in China and, therefore, the strength of the 
enemy which is the second characteristic should not be under-
estimated . Mao indicated the Red Army was weak because it 
was small in numbers and had very few supplies. Thus, the 
weakness of the Red Army, the third characteristic, must be 
taken into consideration in planning strategy. The leader-
ship of the Party is a basic idea which must not be over-
looked if the Communists hope to achieve victory. Out of 
these characteristics come the two main aspects of China's 
revolutionary war. The first and fourth characteristics de-
termine the possibility of the Chinese Red Army growing and 
defeating its enemy. The second and third characteristics 
determine the impossibility of the Chinese Red Army growing 
rapidly or bringing about a quick defeat of the enemy. 7 
This is a fundamental law of the Chinese revolution, accord-
ing to Mao, and those who cannot see laws of a fundamental 
nature cannot direct China's revolutionary war. 
Under the heading of strategic defensive there are 
nine different phases which are discussed by Mao. These 
7Mao, Selected Works, Vol . I, 193-197. 
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phases are: (1) active defense and passive defense; (2) 
preparation for a campaign against "encirclement and an-
nihilation;·" (3) strategic retreat; (4) strategic counter-
offensive; (5) problems of starting the counter-offensive; 
(6) problems of troop concentration; (7) mobile warfare; 
( 8) war of quick decision; and (.9) war of annihilation. 8 
By the use of this essay Mao is trying to point out the 
correct methods which must be followed in carrying the 
Chinese Communist Revolution to a successful termination. 
A major event in the field of military affairs in the Chinese 
revolution is the 11 Long March." This is one of Mao's great-
est military achievements and a very good example of his 
application of his theory of strategic retreat. Almost 
trapped by the Kuomintang forces Mao decided to move the 
Communist army into northwestern China. The Communist 
army covered about 5,000 miles in a little over a year's 
time (368 days) and had only forty-four days rest during 
that period. 9 This movement probably saved Mao 's forces 
from complete destruction and allowed him to continue his 
revolutionary movement and practice. 
The series of lectures delivered by Mao on the 
8Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 203-206. 
9Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Random 
House, 1944), 216. 
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subject, "On the Protracted War," were designed to mobilize 
the Chinese people in resistance to the Japanese. 1O In 
these lectures, which were delivered from May 26 to June 3, 
1938, at the Association for the Study of the Anti-Japanese 
War held in Yenan, Mao listed as some of the major problems 
to be solved: 
What will be the actual course of the war? 
Can we win it or not? Can we win it quickly or 
not? Many people are talking about a protracted 
war, but why will the war be protracted? How to 
carry on a protracted war? Many people are talk-
ing about the final victory, but how lf1 victory 
be ours? How shall we strive for it? 
Mao maintains that in order to obtain a united front for 
victory over the Japanese it is necessary to answer these 
questions for the masses of the Chinese people . 
It was his theory that the people nrust be informed 
of the situation and they must be united to fight for vic-
tory. It would be necessary, according to Mao , to carry on 
an extensive propaganda campaign among the masses of the 
people. Mao contended that the Chinese people could win if 
they received the correct leadership, but this leadership 
must understand the problems which it was facing. 
Mao's reasoning that the war with Japan must be of a 
protracted nature stemmed from the fact that Japan was a 
lOMao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 157-243• 
llMao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 157. 
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small nation which was strong and China was a large nation 
which was weak. Mao argued that the strength which Japan 
possessed was her only advantage and China's weakness was 
her only disadvantage. If China would make an effort to 
reduce the advantages of the Japanese and aggravate their 
shortcomings and at the same time make an effort to remedy 
its own shortcomings and enhance its advantages the ulti-
mate victory can belong to the Chinese. 12 
A protracted war is fought in three stages according 
to Mao. The first stage is one of the enemy's strategic 
offensive and a strategic defensive by the Chinese. The 
second stage is one of strategic defensive by the Japanese 
and of preparation by the Chinese for the counter-offensive. 
The third stage is one of Chinese stratPgic counter-of-
fensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. In the first 
stage the enemy will attempt to penetrate so deep they will 
encounter immense difficulties, with consequences so dis-
astrous that they cannot possible imagine them. This 
should, Mao maintains, exhaust the finances and economy of 
the Japanese and dishearten them. The second stage will 
be a stage of strategic stalemate. The advances of the 
Japanese will be stopped and at the same time the Chinese 
12Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 157-183. 
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will be preparing for the counter-offensive. The third 
stage will be the carrying out of the counter-offensive to 
recover lost territory. 13 
Mao asserts three conditions which will be responsible 
for victory in a protracted war. The first is the achieve-
ment of the national united front against the Japanese; the 
second is the formation of a world anti-Japanese united 
front; and the third is revolutionary action by the people 
in Japan and the oppressed peoples at present suffering 
d J . . 1· 14 un er apanese irnperia ism. 
It became necessary for the Chinese Communist Party 
to determine the role the Party should play in a national 
war. In a report to the Central Committee on this subject 
Mao outlined his views. The Central Cr nmittee of the 
Chinese Communist Party adopted Mao's policies as the cor-
rect Party line. Mao professes that a Communist who is an 
internationalist should also be a patriot. Mao proposes 
that it is necessary for the Chinese Communists to combine 
patriotism with internationalism. He maintains that in 
fighting in the defense of the motherland against aggressors 
and defeating their Lmperialistic motives the Party is 
achieving national liberation and only by achieving national 
13Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 183-187. 
14Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 241. 
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liberation will it be possible for the proletariat and the 
toiling masses to achieve their own liberation . Thus pa-
triotism is simply an application of internationalism in 
the war of national liberation. 15 
Mao acknowledges that the united front is necessary 
to win victory, but he maintains the Communist Party must 
keep its ideological, political and organizational inde-
pendence . He admits that independence within the united 
front can only be relative and not absolute. He further 
propounds that to regard it as absolute would undermine the 
general policy of unity against the enemy, but this rela-
tive independence must not be denied. Every member of the 
Communist Party as well as of all the friendly parties 
should clearly understand this. 16 
Mao accentuates that all those members of the Party 
who are fairly qualified to study must study Communist doc-
trine, the history of the nation and the circuinstances and 
trends of the present movement. It is also the duty of 
the Party to organize education for Party members whose 
cultural level is relatively low. Mao contends that it is 
impossible for a Party to lead a great revolutionary move-
ment to victory if it has no knowledge of revolutionary 
15Mao , Selected Works, Vol. II, 245-247. 
16Mao, Selected Works , Vol. II, 249-250. 
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theory, and it is not possible to have a revolutionary 
theory unless the Party members are educated so that it is 
possible for them to study the history and develop an under-
standing of the movement. It is the purpose of the study 
on the "Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National 
War" to develop a united front and unity within the Com-
munist Party. It is Mao's concept that if this unity is 
achieved a strong nucleus will be established not only to 
win the war from the Japanese but also to build a New 
China. 1 7 
The most important victory in the military field for 
Mao was, of course, the one over the Nationalists armies in 
1949. When leaders of the Kuomintang Party began to ask 
for peace Mao told them a peace could be made only on his 
terms which were as follows: 
(1) Punish War Criminals. 
(2) Abrogate the bogus Constitution. 
(3) Abolish the Kuomintag 1 s legitimacy of 
traditional institutions. 
(4) Reorganize the revolutionary armies in 
accordance with democratic principles. 
(5) Confiscate bureaucratic capital. 
(6) Reform the Agrarian system. 
(7) Abrogate the treaties of national betrayal. 
17Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 258-261. 
(8) Convoke a Political Consultative meeting 
without the participation of reactionary 
elements, establish a democratic coalition 
government and take over all power from the 
Nanking Kuomintang reactionary gove1:grnent and the lower levels of government. 
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On January 14, 1949, Mao broadcast these terms from North 
Shensi, China, by radio and in the speech he alleged that 
the Chinese Cormnunists felt the above mentioned points were 
a satisfactory explanation of the will of the Chinese 
people. He also put forth the idea the Cormnunists would 
accept peace only on the basis of these eight points and 
only by acceptance of these points could a genuine demo-
cratic peace be established. 19 Some members of the Kuomin-
tang accepted these terms while others continued to fight 
and were finally forced to move their government to Formosa. 
While the foregoing terms for peace were dictated 
to the Kuomintang, Mao's theory of peace is quite different 
than one might expect. On the subject of war Mao stated, 
"war, the monster of mutual slaughter among mankind, will 
finally be eliminated through the progress of human society, 
and in no distant future. 1120 However, Mao maintains that 
18New York Times, January 15, 1949, 4. 
l9Mao Tse-tung, "Chinese Communist Party Peace 
Terms," Vital Speeches, XV (May 1, 1949), 432-433 • 
20Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 179. 
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there is only one way of eliminating war, namely, to oppose 
war by means of war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war by 
means of revolutionary war, and to oppose counter-revolution-
ary class war by the means of revolutionary class war. To 
carry his theory further Mao contends that there are only 
two kinds of war in history, just and unjust. It is the 
duty of the Communist Party of China to support all just 
wars and oppose all unjust wars according to Mao. In de-
termining whether a war is just or unjust Mao suggests that 
all counter-revolutionary wars are unjust and all revo-
lutionary wars are just. Mao professes that the revolution-
ary war being waged by the Communists in China is against 
the greatest and most ruthless of all unjust counter-revo-
lutionary wars. According to Mao, the h anner of the Com-
munist's revolutionary war is the banner for the salvation 
of China. This is a just war because it is being waged by 
the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. This will 
undoubtedly be the most honorable undertaking for saving 
China, and will form a bridge leading world history into a 
new era. Mao declares that his war is a step in advancing 
human society to the point where classes and states are 
eliminated. Thus, when this era is achieved it will bring 
the ideal Communist society and when all the people of the 
world are Communists there will be no need for war. Mao 
claims that the will of the Cormnunists to eliminate war is 
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the dividing line between them and the exploiting classes. 21 
The introduction of the commune has had definite 
effects on the military alignment in Communist China. There 
is a move afoot in Communist China to disperse industry and 
administrative services throughout the country so as to 
eliminate the vulnerability of a centralized socialist econ-
omy. From the outset Peking has laid emphasis on the mili-
tary functions of the communes; it has declared that the 
same organization which will be used to mobilize labor for 
whatever purpose it is needed can be used also for defense 
in time of war. It appears, indeed, that the communes are 
to be run on semi-military lines and that their members 
will form milita units available for partisan resistance 
in the event of foreign invasion or fo1 the suppression of 
local disturbances. The people of Communist China are told 
that the practice of making everybody a soldier is an im-
portant measure of consolidating the national defense and 
safeguarding the socialist construction. Mao thinks the 
milita is a good organization and should be promoted. It 
is a part of Mao's strategical thinking that it is impor-
tant to make everybody a good soldier either in the army 
21Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 179. 
22 or those serving in people's connnunes. 
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22American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current 
Background, No. 520, September 30, 1958, 1-4. This is the 
basic document cited for the information of military 
happenings in the communes, however, a number of other 




In the area of economic organization in 1934, a part 
of Mao Tse-tung 1 s policy was to carry out all the economic 
construction that was possible as well as essential. He 
argued that it was necessary for state enterprise to become 
dominant over private enterprise and the proletariat should 
be dominant over the peasantry in order to lay the foun-
dation for the future development into socialism. Mao also 
realized that it would be necessary to concentrate economic 
strength to provide for the anti-Japanese war and the Com-
munist revolutionary war respectively and at the same time 
improve living conditions to consolidate the economic al-
liance of the workers and peasants. 1 
The concept of economic construction is based on 
the development of agricultural and industrial production, 
trade with Western areas and the co-operatives. In the 
development of agricultural production Mao believes close 
attention should be given to the methods of production and 
he feels it is necessary that the old methods of produc-
tion be improved and new methods be introduced. The first 
1Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: Inter-
national Publishers, 4 Vols. 1954-1956), Vol. I, 141. 
Hereinafter cited as Mao, Selected Works. 
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step in gaining better methods of production is the distri-
bution of the land among the peasants for only after the 
land i s distributed to the peasants and the peasants' pro-
duction is promoted and encouraged will the labor enthusi-
asm of the peasants burst forth and great victories in pro-
duction be achieved. As for the industrial production Mao 
maintains that with proper planning the industries can be 
kept going . Mao agrees that it is impossible to make com-
pletely detailed and comprehensive plans, but he does be-
lieve that fairly detailed plans of production are absolutely 
2 necessary . 
It was necessary in 1934, to conceive some plan to 
trade with the Western areas and let the state handle the 
distribution of certain products. The .ational economy of 
China for this period was composed of three sectors: state 
enterprise, co-operative enterprise and private enterprise. 
While state enterprises had started to grow they were still 
confined to what was possible and essential. As long as 
private enterprise did not go beyond the legal limits es-
tablished by the government, the Communist Party not only 
refrained from prohibiting private enterprise, but pro-
moted and encouraged it . The development of private 
2Mao, Selected Works, Vol . I, 142-145 . 
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enterprise was necessary at this time in the interests of 
the s tate and the people. The co-operative movement, of 
course, was still in its infancy. When co-operatives have 
been co-ordinated and have passed through a considerable 
period of development, co-operatives will become a tre-
mendous force in the economic sphere and will gradually 
gain preponderance and assume leadership over private 
enterprise . 3 
The basic line in Mao's fiscal policy is to increase 
income through the development of national e ~~nomy . It is 
the duty of the economic and fina r ial organizations of the 
Party to make a serio~s effort to achieve this polic r. Fi-
n8ncial expenditure is to be governed by the principle of 
economy and it should be made clear tc all govermaent per-
sonnel that corruption and waste are the greatest crimes. 
One of Mao I s principal thoughts in regard to the account-
ing system is that every single coin should be saved either 
for the war, the revolution or economic construction.4 
In his speech, "China I s New Democracy, rt made on Jan-
uary 19, 1940, Mao called for the establishment of a repub-
lic that is economically new democratic as well as 
3Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 144-145 . 
4Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 145 . 
politically new democratic.5 In order to implement this 
policy Mao contended that big banks and big industry and 
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big corrnnercial enterprise should be owned by the republic. 
Any enterprises which are monopolistic in character or on 
too large a scale for private management, such as banks, 
railways and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-
owned, should be operated by the state so that private capi-
tal cannot dominate the livelihood of the people. This is 
one of the main principles of the control of capital. The 
state-operated enterprises of the new democratic republic 
are to be socialist in character and constitute the leading 
force in the national economy. The state-operated enter-
prises are to be under the leadership of the proletariat. 
This does not mean, however, that the republic will take 
over the forms of capitalist private property which cannot 
dominate the livelihood of the people, for China 1 s economy 
6 
is still very backward. 
5Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 106-156. Mao Tse-
tung, 11 China 1 s New Democracy, 11 The Strategy and Tactics of 
World Com.~unism, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of-
Sub-Comrnittee No. 5, Supplement III, 81st Congress, 1st 
Session, House Document No. 154-Part 3, Appendix B (Wash-
ington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), 
500-513. Hereinafter cited as Mao, "Democracy, n Strategy. 
6Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 122. Mao, "Democ-
racy," Strategy, 80. 
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Mao suggests that it will be necessary to adopt cer-
tain measures to confiscate the land of landlords and dis-
tribute it to those peasants who have no land or only a 
little land. It is also necessary for the Communist Party 
to adopt Sun Yat-sen I s slogan of II land to the tillers, 11 
abolish the feudal relations in the rural areas and turn 
the land into the private property of the peasants. There-
fore, the policy of equalization of land ownership and con-
trol of capital should be used. Mao maintains that China's 
economy should be developed along these lines and that 
this line must never be monopolized by a few. He felt 
that those who dared to run counter to this line should be 
dealt with harshly. Thus, with these views in mind, it 
becomes necessary for the new democratir politics to become 
the concentrated expression of the new democratic economy. 7 
The economic problem which confronts Mao and the 
Chinese Communists is one of tremendous proportion. In 
order to build any type of economy in present-day China it 
is necessary to bring about numerous reforms in all fields 
concerned in the economic situation of China. China's in-
dustrial development has been very limited and most of the 
industrial construction which has been carried on in China 
7Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 122-123. Mao, 
"Democracy, 11 Strategy, tl0-81. 
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has been achieved th.rough the use of foreign capital. The 
economic problem on the agrarian scene is not much brighter~ 
Up to the time of the Chinese Communist Revolution most of 
the land and wealth of the people of the rural areas was 
concentrated in the hands of a small ruling class. It is 
now necessary for the Communists to try to distribute this 
wealth in furthering production and bringing about much 
needed reforms. The task of rejuvenating the economy of 
China is the problem which Mao and the Chinese Communists 
are trying to solve. 
It is apparent that the communes are a definite at-
tempt to pump new life into the sagging economic situation 
in which the Communists found themselves. The whole idea 
of gradual economic progress has been ~bandoned and in its 
place has appeared the new economic organization of Mao 
and the Communist Party which contends that China's prog -
ress must be achieved by "leaps" instead of a gradual eco-
nomic program. The Party line which has been introduced 
by Mao concerning this movement is that nothing is impos-
sible for China's vast population if it has the correct 
leadership. Officials who are in charge of production are 
being instructed not to obstruct the idealism and initia-
tive of China's great masses. 8 
8These statements are based upon the publications of 
the American Consulate General, Hong Kong for the years 1958-
1959. 
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The first step in building a finance program in the 
people's communes is the establisbment of a fiscal organi-
zation that suits the demand of the communes. In order to 
accomplish this the original form of financial organization 
must be changed by transferring the task of finance from 
the hsiang9 to the people's communes, and to co-ordinate 
the fiscal program according to the objective needs of 
various enterprises of production and construction. In 
making this transfer there are two problems which the Com-
munists must solve. On the one hand, the power to control 
finance must be transferred from hsiang finance to the 
people's communes and the mutual relations between the 
hsien10 finance and the commune finance must be clearly 
defined. On the other hand, the form in which fiscal pay-
ment is made by the people's communes to their superior 
organs should be improved. To solve the problem of the 
power to control finance it will be necessary to transfer 
the control of properties which were under the control of 
hsiang finance and at the same time, industrial and com-
mercial enterprises, banking office, grain controlling 
stations, livestock protecting and breeding station, health 
9Hsiang -- A village in China. 
lOHsien -- A province in China. 
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centers and schools will all come Wlder the control of the 
people's communes. All expenditures related to these dif-
ferent areas of control are to be paid by the commW1es. 
The Party line is to draw the dividing line on this basis 
between commune finance and hsien finance. However, on 
major construction projects which the hsien governments re-
quire to be built and which may yield benefit to more than 
one commune should be jointly undertaken by the hsien gov-
ernment and the commune or communes concerned. The Chinese 
Communist leaders also want to improve the form of fiscal 
payment made to the superior organ of government to suit 
the demand for unified operation and production. These re-
lations determine the relations between the commune finance 
and the hsien finance and also the for in which the commW1e 
will pay revenues to its superior organ. 11 
According to the Chinese CommW1ist government the 
commune finance is a new type of basic level finance com-
bining finance with fiscal affairs. It is the purpose of 
the cmnm.une to realize the fW1ctions of finance and under-
take the task for the state accumulation and distribution 
of funds. Another duty to be performed by the commune is 
llAmerican Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current 
Background, No. 548, February 2, 1959, 15-16. Hereinafter 
cited as Consulate, Background, No. 548. 
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to organize, under the guidance of the state finance, the 
activities concerning financial affairs within the commune 
and undertake the task of centralizing and distributing the 
12 funds in the commune. 
The finance of the people's commune will be a de-
veloped form of the hsiang finance. The commune inherits 
the task of the hsiang finance to mobilize funds for state 
construction and conducts some principles governing the 
organization of hsiang finance, such as centralized leader-
ship and management by levels. It is the desire of the 
Communist Party that commune finance will combine finance 
with fiscal affairs and bring finance more closely to pro-
duction. For these reasons it has advantages over the 
hsiang finance which are as follows: 
First, the commune finance integrates fi-
nance with production more closely, makes finance 
serve and support production, and encourages the 
development of production. Thus it is easier to 
carry out the principle of 11 from economy to fi-
nance11, develop production, open tax sources and 
guarantee to fulfill and overfulfill the commune 
task for the accumulation of funds. 
Second, more closely, the commune finance in-
tegrates the state interest with commune interest, 
the power to control the commune affairs with the 
power to control the commune finance, and reve-
nues with expenditures. Thus the party committee 
for the commune will pay more attention to the 
fiscal work, improve its leadership over finance, 
12.'consulate, Background, No. 548, 19. 
unify plans, and make overall arrangements. All 
this is the basic guarantee for smooth develop-
ment of the fiscal work. 
Third, the commune finance is more asses-
sible to the masses than the hsiang finance. 
The budget and final account of the cormnune must 
be discussed and approved by the representatives 
of the commune members and the fiscal affairs 
and accounts of different units must be publish-
ed regularly. So the hsiang finance is in a 
more convenient position to draw the masses in-
to the control of finance. Besides, the commune 
finance, whether well or badly operated, affects 
directly the personal interest of each commune 
member. The commune member may be urged to pay 
attention to the fiscal work of the commune. 
For this reason the commune finance becomes the 
best organizational form in the operation of 
finance by the whole party and the whole people. 1 3 
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After the financial org anization of the cormnunes was 
changed it became necessary to change the financial-trading 
system to correspond with the new situation. The People I s 
Bank has sent down to the level of the people's commune its 
rural basic machineries (business offices), and they are 
merged with the original credit co-operatives in different 
localities, as the credit departments of the people's com-
munes, in order to meet the needs of this new situation 
which has occurred by the creation of the people's commune. 
This is being done in order to place the work connected with 
currency and credit in the communes more directly under the 
unified leadership of the Communist Party and administrative 
13consulate, Background, No. 548, 20. 
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authorities of the people's corrrrnunes. This is to be closely 
associated with the departments of industry, agriculture, 
exchange, culture and military affairs of the people's com-
munes, and to serve to consolidate and develop the people's 
communes. It is the plan of the Party to use the communes 
to strengthen the role of currency and credit. The Party 
maintains, therefore, that credit departments must be run 
properly, and that a study of the special characteristics 
and laws of currency and credit under the socialist system 
be made, so that they can grasp and utilize these laws. 
After the conclusions are made the findings should be used 
to serve the "big leap'' forward in industrial and agricul-
tural production and serve the consolidation and develop-
ment of people's communes. 14 
According to the information available in the pub-
lications of the American Consulate General at Hong Kong, 
the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist 
Party are making important gains in the economic field. 
They are expanding industry and increasing industrial out-
put as well as showing a large increase in agricultural 
production. They are developing new methods and improving 
old methods as well as developing new industries. The 
14American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of 
the China Mainland Press, No. 1964, March 3, 1959, 9-12. 
Hereinafter cited as Consulate, Survey, No. 1964. 
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Communist, of course, claim that the economic status of the 
broad masses is much improved since the organization of the 
communes . There are numerous articles found in these pub-
lications about different communes setting new production 
goals for the year 1959. The following is a typical ex-
ample: 
The Siyu People's Commune in Yesien, Shantung 
Province, led by the nationally known model farmer 
Hse Chien-chun, plans to produce an average of 22.5 
tons of grain per hectare as against only 6 tons 
last year.lj 
It is apparent that the Communists are making full use of 
this type of propaganda. 
15consulate, Survey, No. 1964, 13. 
CHAPTER VI 
EDUCATION AND CULTURE 
Mao Tse-tung laid the foundation for his educational 
policies in his speech, non Coalition Government, n delivered 
at the opening of the Seventh National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party on April 24, 1945. 1 A basic point 
of this speech was Mao's contention that the elimination of 
the illiteracy of eighty per cent of the nation's population 
is an important task in the creation of a new China. He 
believes that the calamities which foreign and feudal op-
pression brought to the Chinese people also affects China's 
national culture. Mao argues that the prorressive cultural 
and educational institutions and progre sive cultural work-
ers and educators had particularly suffered from this op-
pression. The elimination of foreign and feudal oppression 
is necessary if China is to establish a new democratic edu-
cational and cultural system, and the efforts of a large 
number of people, including teachers, scientists, writers, 
artists and ordinary cultural workers will be necessary in 
developing this new democratic educational and cultural 
system. Mao also feels that proper recognition should be 
lMao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International 
Publishers, 4 vols., 1954-1956), Vol. IV, 244-315. Herein-
after cited as Mao, Selected Workse 
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given to all intellectuals who have performed meritorious 
service for the people . Mao indicated that the Chinese 
people ' s revolutionary struggle urgently needs the partici-
pation of the intellectuals because the problem of having 
an educated class becomes particularly important in the 
revolutionary movement. He mentions that the intellectuals 
will play even more important roles in forthcoming struggles. 
The people's governrient should, therefore, systematically 
develop among the broad masses various categories of intel-
lectuals to serve as cadres and to unite and re-educate all 
the useful intellectuals that China now has. 2 
According to Mao, proper steps should be taKen by the 
people's governr;1ent to eliminate all slq1ish, feudal and 
.2ascist cultl1 re and edi;c&~inri. qe fel+ th: lOption of 
positive measures :1.ould bo taken to prevent and combat epi-
demics and disease ru1 ong the people ar d that the promotion 
of public sanitation and medical services should be adopted. 
The Chinese people's culture a..~d education sholld be new 
democratic and the Chinese should build up through the 
leadership of the Com.'ilunist Party a new culture and educa-
tion which are national, scientific and popular. fvTao main-
tains that the Chinese must fully absorb progressive 
2Mao, Selected\ orks, Vol. IV, 299-300. 
85 
foreign culture as an aid to the development of China's new 
culture, but it must not indiscriminately import foreign 
culture into China. The foreign culture which is to be used 
must meet the actual needs of the Chinese people.3 
It is Mao's belief that the new democratic culture 
must be a national culture. It must oppose bnperialist op-
pression and uphold the dignity and independence of the 
Chinese nation. If this new democratic culture is achieved 
it will unite with the socialist and new democratic cultures 
of all other nations and establish with them relations which 
will make it possible for the two cultures to absorb ideas 
from each other and aid each other in development. Mao 
maintains that China should absorb on a large scale the pro-
gressive cultures of foreign countrie i as ingredients for 
Chinese; but it can never unite its culture with any reaction-
ary imperialist culture of any nation, for China's culture 
is a revolutionary culture. In order to determine which 
cultures and which parts of cultures should be adopted by 
China, Mao suggests that the foreign material be treated as 
food is treated. Food, he pointed out, is chewed in the 
mouth, submitted to the working of the stomach and intes-
tines and then separated into essence to be absorbed and 
3Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 300. 
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waste matter to be discarded. He maintains that only when 
this procedure is followed will food do the body any good 
and only when the Chinese are selective and thorough in 
choosing the cultures or parts of cultures they want to use 
will the cultures do their culture any good . Out of this 
should be developed a Chinese culture which should have its 
own form, namely, a national form. National in form and 
new democratic in content, such is the goal of the Chinese 
Communist Party and Mao for the development of a new type 
of culture in China. Even though some ideas are borrowed 
from other cultures they must 1'it into the framework of the 
Chinese culture and take on the appearance of national in 
form and new democratic in content.4 
Mao's educational program is org nized basically to 
indoctrinate the youth of China in the Coramunist Party line. 
There are some indoctrination classes for the older people, 
but the main thought of the educational program is to bring 
the youth of the country into the Corrrrnunist fold. 11 The Com-
munists have always depended on the support of the student 
4Mao Tse-tung, 11 China I s New Democracy, 11 The Strategy 
and Tactics of World Communism, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Report of Sub-Corrrrnittee No. 5, Supplement III, 8ls~ Congress, 
1st Session, House Document No. 154-Part 3, Appendix B 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), 
139 -90. Hereinafter cited as Mao, "Democracy, 11 Strategy. 
Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 153-154. 
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class. To the students they have directed a continuous pro-
gram of propaganda; from the students they have recruited 
their most enthusiastic propagandists and cadres. 5 
It appears the Communists are having a considerable 
amount of success in the indoctrination of the youth of 
China. It is the future in which Mao is interested, and it 
is the young people of China who hold the key to the future. 6 
In the young mind the focus of loyalty is being shifted from 
the family to the state. One of the prime objectives of 
Mao's remolding movement is to cut the roots of obedience 
and domestic loyalties by transferring the reverence from 
the head of the family to the head of state. The child is 
the charge of the state not of its parents.7 
The first step in the indoctrin-- tion process is the 
education of the teachers and professors to fit the Com-
munist Party line. In order to remold thinking and ideolo-
gies in any society it is necessary to re-organize the edu-
cational system first. It is apparent that Mao understands 
this theory because his first aim is to educate the teachers 
and professors. This program was carried out during 1952. 
5Theodore His-en Chen, 11 China: Communism Wins, 11 Cur-
rent History, XIX (August, 1950), 78. 
6New York Times, September 9, 1956, 72. 
7Frank Moraes, Report on Mao's China (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1953), 47-[i:"8'. Hereinafter cited as 
Morae s, Re port. 
88 
During the ideological remolding period the teachers and 
professors were given a chance to repent their capitalistic 
ideas. There was a period of several months in China, dur-
ing which classes were stopped, while professors and teach-
ers engaged in orgies of open mutual recrimination and 
abject self-criticism. 8 
The first step in educational reform as far as ideas 
were concerned was to eliminate the feudal ideology which 
dominated the old educational system. Love for the father-
land and for the people of the country, love of labor, 
science, and taking care of public property were specifically 
mentioned as the desired traits of national character to be 
developed by education. The study of science is stressed 
in the Chinese Communist schools as Mao realizes that in 
order to build up the nation and to develop her industries 
China must have good scientists. Science is also important 
in agriculture and national defense. Another purpose was 
the application of the scientific historical viewpoint to 
the study of history, economics, politics, culture and 
international affairs. 9 
8New York Times, September 9, 1956, 72. 
9Theodore His-en Chen, "New China: New Texts, 11 
Current History, XIX (December, 1950), 321-322. 
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The New Democratic Youth League which was organized 
in 1949, drew its members from all youthful elements of 
society, outside as well as within the schools. It was 
broader than a purely Communist organization, but it was 
made clear that it would function under the leadership of 
the Communist Party. In addition to organizing youth, dis-
seminating propaganda in schools, factories and rural dis-
tricts, and executing government directives, the Youth 
Corps united the broad masses of youth to study Marxism-
Leninism and the Mao Tse-tung Doctrine. Mao is using this 
organ to the fullest possible extent in indoctrinating the 
youth of China in his doctrines. 10 
Under the leadership and influence of the Russians, 
Cornnnmists everywhere have placed great importance upon the 
willingness of the Corrrrnunist Party member to subject him-
self to the criticism of his comrades and also to engage in 
self-criticism. The Chinese Communists go one step further 
in the methods of criticism by comrades and self-criticism. 
They are extending both these processes to a whole people. 
The entire population of China is expected, periodically, 
to analyze their thoughts, deeds and motives in public, 
and to prove that their minds have been cleared of all 
10s . B. Thomas, "Recent Educational Policies in 
China," Pacific Affairs, XXIII (March, 1950), 30. 
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bourgeois influences. This form of public examination of 
conscience and confession is more far-reaching., its appli-
cation more universal., than anything ever attempted else-
where by any Communist regime. 11 
Mao believes it is necessary to achieve a proper re-
lationship between the revolutionary movement and art and 
literature. The basis for this relationship was established 
in Yenan in 1942, at a conference held to determine the 
correct relationship of art and literature to the revo-
lutionary movement •12 It is Ifao I s contention that the 
struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people is being 
waged on various fronts which includes the fields of art 
and literature. He admits that victory over the Kuomintang 
depends primarily on an army of soldier '"' with guns in their 
hands, nevertheless., he feels a cultural army is equally 
indispensable for uniting China and dei'eating its enemy. 
Mao propounds the theory that the duty of the people in the 
llnouglas Hyde., 11 Mao: New Prophet of i:orld Communism," 
America, XCII (March 19, 1955), 642. 
12Mao, Selected 1-Jorks, Vol. IV., 63-93. Mao Tse-tung, 
n Problems of Art and Literature, n The Communist Conspiracy, 
Part I: Communism Outside the United States., Section D: Com-
munist Activities Around the World., douse Repor•t No. 2243, 
May 29., 1956, United States Congress, Committee on Un-Ameri-
can Activities., 84th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1956)., 513-518. 
Hereinafter cited as Mao, "Problems," Conspiracy. 
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artistic and literary fields is that of serving the prole-
tariat and the broad masses of the people by correctly 
using their talents in their specific fields to further the 
Communist revolutionary movement. He also professes that 
it is necessary for the artists and writers to adopt three 
views concerning the evaluation of material. The artists 
and writers must develop the views of standpoint, attitude 
and audience because they will be coming into contact with 
material of the enemies, the allies and their own people 
and, therefore, need to be able to determine the correct 
line. 13 
Mao contends that it is necessary for the artists 
and writers to understand and know something about the 
audience for whom their art and literat,,re are intended. 
This audience will be composed mainly of workers, peasants, 
soldiers and their cadres. It is necessary that the artists 
and writers fuse their ideas with those of the broad masses 
of workers, peasants and soldiers so this group, for whom 
the work is intended, will receive the benefit of the 
labors of the artists and writers. If art and literature 
do not meet the requirement of promoting the revolutionary 
cause, the artists and writers must undergo a thorough 
13Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 63-64. Mao, "Problems," 
Conspiracy, 513-514. 
92 
remolding procedure to bring them in line with the Party's 
revolutionary movement. This makes it necessary for any 
writer or artist to have a thorough understanding of 
Marxism-Leninism. 14 
Since art and literature are intended for the broad 
masses Mao suggests it is necessary to understand the prob-
lems of inner-Party relations between the art and literature 
work and the Party work as a whole and the relation of 
Party writers and artists with the non-Party writers and 
artists. Mao, in discussing inner-Party relations, main-
tains that art and literature belong to a class or a party, 
and therefore, they respond to the political demands of a 
class or party. Art and literature will also respond to 
the revolutionary task of a given revol1 'tionary period and 
when they deviate from this principle, they divorce them-
selves from the basic needs of the people. Mao argues, 
therefore, that the literature and art of the proletariat 
are a part of the revolutionary program of the proletariat 
and the role of the Party's work in art and literature is 
determined by the over-all revolutionary program of the 
Party. This means that the revolutionary struggles on the 
ideological and artistic fronts must be subordinate to the 
14Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 65-68. Mao, 
11 Problems, u Conspiracy, 5f4. 
political struggle because only through politics can the 
needs of.' the masses be expressed in a common f.'orm. Mao 
emphasizes that since this is true it is very necessary to 
obtain the correct relationship between art and literature 
and the Party. 15 
93, 
According to Mao, it is necessary to carry on rela-
tions between the artists and writers of.' the Party and the 
non-Party artists and writers. He feels there are certain 
groups within the non-Party writers and artists which would 
be benef.'icial to the revolutionary movement even though 
they have many shortcomings in their ideology. He suggests 
that this group is conf.'ined mainly to the petty-bourgeois 
artists and writers and it is especially important to try 
to help them overcome their shortcomingr and win them over 
to the Party line. 16 
It is Mao's contention that culture is the ref.'lection 
of a given political and economic system of.' society, though 
politics in turn exerts an immense amount of inf.'luence upon 
economics, and politics are the concentrated expression of 
economy . Therefore, it is the given politics and economy 
which first determines a given culture. Mao professes that 
15Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 81-82. Mao, 
11 Problems, 11 Conspiracy, 514-515 • 
16Mao, Selected Works , Vol. IV, 83-84. Mao, 
11 Problems, 11 Conspiracy, 515-516. 
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the Chinese Communist revolutionary movement will give China 
a new culture because it will give it a new economy and new 
politics . 17 
The Chinese Communist government is controlling all 
phases of personal and group life. It is the purpose of 
the Communist Party to change every feature of Chinese so-
ciety including standards, values, institutions, habits and 
customs. To remold the thinking of the Chinese people the 
Communists are teaching a double standard of morality. 
There is one standard for the friends of the revolution and 
another for the enemies of the revolution. It is the duty 
of the people to love and cooperate with friends and com-
rades; at the same time they must learn to hate enemies of 
the revolution and strive to destroy the '1 without scruples 
and without compassion. This double standard is also in-
corporated into the political theory of the Chinese Com-
munist state. This new theory is called the democratic 
dictatorship. According to Mao, democracy is reserved for 
the active supporters of the revolution, and dictatorship 
applies to the reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries, 
who are being ruthlessly suppressed. 18 
l 7Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 141. Mao, "Democra-
cy," Strategy, 84. 
18Theodore His-en Chen, "The Marxist Remolding of 
Chinese Society, 11 American Journal of Sociology, LVIII 
(January, 1953), 341-346. -
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Mao suggests the content of the new Chinese culture 
means neither the cultural domination of the bourgeoisie, 
nor the imposition of the Socialist culture of the prole-
tariat, but means the construction of a people's culture, 
with an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal content, carried 
out under the guidance of proletarian thought. It is Mao's 
desire that the combination of the new democratic politics, 
new democratic economy and new democratic culture will con-
stitute the edifice of a republic of New Democracy, a re-
public in name and in fact • 19 
The control of the people's education and culture 
in China is probably best stated by Frank Moraes in his 
book, Report on Mao's China. Mr. Moraes describes a picnic 
procession of children in the following ~anner: 
Solemn children marching four abreast, march-
ing to a picnic. Robots on the road. Sun-
light and shadow. It was incongruous and 
absurd. It was also pathetic. But in those 
school children tramping solemnly to a pic-
nic I think I saw briefly and in a flash 
the heart and mind of Mao's China.20 
It appears that the design of economic life in the 
communes is aimed at breaking down what the Communists re-
gard as the principal obstacle to the attainment of their 
19Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 136. Mao, 11Democra-
cy,11 Strategy, 91. 
2 0Moraes, Report, 41. 
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ends; this obstacle is the close family ties which are 
present in Chinese society . The Communists are carrying 
out the principle of collective work thoroughly. The young 
children are to be cared for in day nurseries so that women 
can work on the land or in mines and factories. All meals 
are to be taken, if possible, in canteens, and household 
cleaning, sewing and mending will be done by squads going 
from house to house, so that there will be virtually noth-
ing left to do in the home. It is the apparent hope of the 
Communist Party that the family will lose all significance 
as a social unit and that the reverence which the head of 
the family has been receiving will be transferred to the 
head of the state. This, of course, is a basic Communist 
aim in the education and cultural field. 21 
The leaders of the Communist Party in China maintain 
that in the development of cultural activities in the 
people's communes, politics must assume command. Since the 
building of the people's communes, the Party's leadership 
over cultural work has been strengthened, the Party leaders 
profess that their policies and tasks have become more 
clarified, and mass cultural activities are thus being led 
on a healthier road. It is the contention of many of th~ 
21Based upon the publications of the American Con-
sulate at Hong I ong. 
Party members that they must always be vigilant over the 
capitalist trend in cultural work which attaches greater 
weight to the old and neglects the new, and is divorced 
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from politics and production. Thus, in their opinion, the 
most important thing is to let politics assume command in 
the development of cultural activities. If this is to be 
done the Communists think the leadership of the Party must 
be strengthened organizationally, and the literary ranks 
must be purified. The Party has built or is building cul-
tural centers in the majority of people's communes. The 
administrative corrrrnittees of these cultural centers are under 
the unified leadership of the propaganda department of the 
Party committees. The director of a cultural center is a 
responsible cadre who is a member of t l 3 Party, and elite 
Party members are selected to lead in the work of cultural 
work corps, club houses, libraries and exhibition halls. 
Among the rank and file of the cultural workers, the Party 
members believe they must achieve the combination of culture 
and art, politics and propaganda, and labor and production, 
using Communist thoughts to arm the literary hardcore ele-
ments. Those who are politically opposed to socialism, even 
if they have special talent, must not be allowed to join the 
ranks of the literary force. The Party leaders feel they 
must develop a way of launching a resolute struggle against 
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impure elements who have infiltrated into their ranks, and 
expel them~2 
Ideologically, the Party committees have organized 
cultural activities as weapons for the ideological struggle. 
Cultural work in a people's commune must resolutely imple-
ment the policy of serving politics, serving production and 
serving the workers, peasants and soldiers. It is the con-
tention of the Communi~ts that education in socialism and 
communism must be actively developed among the broad masses. 
Whatever the current central task happens to be, the Party 
leaders maintain that it should provide the theme for plays 
staged for propaganda conducted and wherever production ef-
forts are extended cultural activities should be extended 
too. In this way, the Communists thir: socialist culture 
will develop with great fanfare in the wake of the socialist 
construction cause as a whole. The cultural work of the 
people's communes must be combined with production and 
physical labor must be combined with mental labor. All 
cultural organizations must be developed to the state in 
which they are at the same time shock production corps as 
well as cultural propaganda corps. It is the contention of 
the Party that all workers must truly achieve the combination 
22:.American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current 
Backgroung, No. 539, December 15, 1958, 5-6. Hereinafter 
cited as Consulate, Background, No. 539. 
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of physical and mental labor. All production organizations 
must exert great efforts in developing cultural enterprises. 
It is Mao's belief that these cultural enterprises operated 
by the people's communes can achieve greater, faster, better 
and more economical results due to the combination of pro-
duction with culture. At the same time this combination 
plays an important role in pushing forward the building of 
socialism and the consolidation of the people's communes. 23 
The Chinese Communists emphasize social education 
because, first, the children are members of the Communist 
society which has the responsibility of fostering and edu-
cating them. Second, the family institution will be grad-
ually superseded by the collective life of the communes. 
Third, home education is inferior to focial education be-
cause it often breeds spoilt children indisposed toward 
labor, and selfishness. If a student gets a Communist edu-
cation in school and receives a non-Communist education at 
home, the results can not be satisfactory. The Communist 
claim that flaws in home education in this respect are be-
coming increasingly conspicious and, therefore, they advo-
cate the boarding school which calls into full play the 
superiority of social education. First, this type of school 
23consulate, Background, No. 539, 7-8. 
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is in a good position to make unified plans for study, 
labor, cultural and social activities with full regard of 
ages and other characteristics of the boarding students and 
to co-ordinate education with labor ingenuity for the train-
ing of well-rounded personnel. A second point is that the 
children will eat, live, labor and study together in big 
Communist families and develop in the atmosphere of the Com-
munist quality of "one for all and all for one.n Third, 
the school not only teaches but also trains the children in 
a socialistic manner. Fourth, the further the Communist 
society develops, the higher the degree of collectivism will 
be, and consequently, the more important to the Communists 
will be the education of the Chinese children in collectivism 
and having them live and eat together. By the use of this 
method the Communist will be able to completely destroy 
loyalty to the family and transfer this loyalty to the 
state. 24 
Thus, by controlling the education and culture of 
the Chinese people the Communist Party marches on the road 
to what they claim is true Communismo How effectively they 
maintain this control will have a definite bearing on the 
success of their program. 
24American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current 
Background , No • .540, December 18, 19.58, 3-4. 
CHAPTER VII 
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
Mao Tse-tung's basis for the organization of the 
Chinese Communist government is found in his article, "China rs 
New Democracy, 11 which was written near the end of 1940.1. 
The adoption of the Common Program by the Chinese People, s 
Political Consultative Council2 is actually the embodiment 
of Mao's "New Democracy" as the guiding light of the Com-
munist government of China. The Common Program is a sixty-
article manifesto which states that it should be jointly 
observed by all units participating in the CPPCC, the people's 
government at all levels, and the people of the entire 
country. 3 
lMao Tse-tung, "China's New Democracy," The Strate~y 
and Tactics of World Cornunism, Committee on Fore'Tgn Affairs, 
Report of Sub-Committee No. S, Supplement III, 81st Congress, 
1st Session, House Document No. 154-Part 3, Appendix B 
(Washington: United States Government Printin~ Office, 1949), 
67-91. Hereinafter cited as Mao, "Democracy,' Strategy. Mao 
Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 
4 Vols., 1954-1956), Vol. III, 106-156. Hereinafter cited 
as Mao, Selected Works. 
2The Chinese People's Political Consultative Council 
will be referred to as the CPPCC. 
3s. B. Thomas, "Structure and Constitutional Basis 
of the Chinese People's Republic,n Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, CCLXXVII (September, 
1951), 51. -
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In his move to take over the Chinese nation and turn 
it into a Communist ruled land, Mao argues that there must 
be two stages in the revolutionary movement which will bring 
the Comrnun·sts into power. The first stage of the revo-
lution is the new democracy which is not a regular type of 
democracy, but a special type of Chinese democracy. The 
second stage is the Socialist movement which is designed to 
bring about the socialization of China. According to Mao 
the Socialist stage will not come for some time because the 
stage of new democracy, which lays the foundation for the 
Socialist era, will last for several years.4 
On July 1, 1949, Mao made a speech, "The People's 
Democratic Dictatorship, 11 in commemoration of the Twenty-
eighth Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party.5 In the 
speech Mao suggested that the experiences of the past few 
decades instruct the people of China to enforce a demo-
cratic dictatorship by the people, or in other words, the 
dictatorship of the people. He maintains that if the 
people choose this type of government they will have control 
of it. According to Mao, the democratic dictatorship is 
4Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 106. Mao, "Democ-
racy, 11 Strategy, 70. 
5Mao Tse-tung, "The People I s Democratic Dictatorship, 11 
Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 95, 
Part 7, 9345-9348. Hereinafter cited as Mao, "Dictatorship," 
Congressional Record, Vol. 95. 
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the only type of government which can lead the Chinese 
people out of the oppression and confusion which has been 
caused by other governing factions. If the broad masses of 
the people of China would accept the democratic dictator-
ship type of government it would mean, Mao stated, "The 
democratic system is to be carried out within the ranks of 
the people, giving them freedom of speech, assembly, and 
association. 116 Also, the reactionaries would be deprived 
of the right to vote because only the masses of the Chinese 
people have the right to speak. 
To bring about necessary reforms Mao thinks the 
people have to be re-educated in order "to unlearn" the bad 
habits and ideas which have been acquired from the old so-
ciety. If this educational process is c rried out it will 
prevent the Chinese people from following the erroneous 
path which is pointed out by the reactionaries. Mao and 
other prominent Communists argue that suppression of per-
sons opposed to this new order is necessary and essential 
for the survival of the democratic dictatorship. 7 
On April 24, 1945, Mao Tse-tung made a political re-
port entitled, 11 0n Coalition Government, 11 to the Seventh 
9346. 
6Mao, nDictatorship,u Congressional Record, Vol. 95, 
7 s. B. Thomas, "Government and Administration in 
China Today ,1' Pacific Affairs, XXIII (September, 1950), 
267-268. 
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National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party . 8 In this 
repor t Mao declares: 
The state structure of New Democracy should be 
based on democratic centraJism, with the people's 
congresses at various levels determining the major 
policies and electing the government . It is at 
once democratic and centralised, i . e. centralised 
on the basis of democracy and democratic under 
centralised guidance . Only this system can , on 
the one hand, give full expression to democracy 
by investing with full powers the people ' s con-
gresses at all levels and , on the other, guar-
antee the centralised administration of state 
affairs by enabling the governments at various 
levels to effect centralised administration 
of qll 8ffairs entrusted to thew by the peo-
ple's congresses at their corresponding leve::.r-
. - i protect all the indisijer~ 'lble deruocratic 
activities of the people. 
Another point of importance in Hao' s political 
organization is the idea of consolidating the masses and 
getting the view point of the masses. ·.ao told Gunther 
Stein in an interview in 1945, that the "mass viewpoint" is 
the most fundamental point of the Communist Party of China. 
Mao thinks the leaders of the Party must work through the 
broad masses of people and listen to the people to obtaL~ 
this point of view . One of the processes used to obtain 
opinions of the people is popular meetings in villa6es, 
towns, districts , regions and everywhere in the territory of 
8Mao , Selected Works , Vol . IV, 244- 315 . 
9Mao , Selected Works , Vol . IV, 272-273 . 
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China. 10 
The Chinese Communist leaders generally attribute 
their conquest of power to the faithful pursuit of effec-
tive "mass line" tactics. Furthermore, they regard a cor-
rect mass line as essential for the full consolidation of 
power. The policies have to be executed correctly in order 
to bring about the far-reaching policies to which they are 
committed. They also hope, and it appears to be coming 
true, this will ultimately bring about the transition from 
the "people's democratic dictatorship" to the complete 
Socialist order. The mass line is designed to effect that 
relationship between the Party and the masses best calcu-
lated to enable the revolutionary leadership to capture 
mass support for its program. The mass 7 ine tactics re-
sembles the classic Marxist-Leninist precept on the "uni-
fication theory and practice. 11 
In the speech, "The People I s Democratic Dictatorship, 11 
Mao maintains that democratic dictatorship is based on the 
unity of labor, peasantry and the bourgeoisie of the cities. 12 
lOGunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China (New 
York: Whittlesey House, 1945), 116. 
llH. Arthur Steiner, 11 Current 'Mass line I Tactics 
in Communist China, 11 American Political Science Review, 
XLV (June, 1951), 422-424. 
12Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 
95, 9345-9348. 
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The strong point of this unity is between the labor class 
and the peasantry. These two classes make up between eighty 
and ninety per cent of the Chinese population. If there is 
to be a realization of socialism the Communist Party must 
successfully unite these two groups and maintain close har-
mony between them in carrying out the Party objectives. 13 
Mao, in a speech made in 1956, to the Eighth Congress 
of the Com.munist Party of China, suggests that the Party 
members should strive not only to bring about unity in the 
Party, but should also strive to unite the nationalities, 
democratic classes, democratic parties, and people's organi-
zations, and to consolidate and expand a people's democratic 
united front. 14 
To eliminate feudalism and monopoly capitalism is 
the object of the new democratic revolution. In other words 
Mao is aiming at the landlord class and the bureaucratic--
the big bourgeoisie--not capitalism in general. In fact, 
Mao admits that a certain amount of capitalistic enterprise 
is necessary for the construction of an economically sound 
New China. Of course, this type of capitalistic enterprise 
will be allowed only during a transitional period and 
13Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 
95, 9347. 
14New York Times, September 16, 1956, J. 
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eventually control of all methods of production must come 
under the leadership of the state or more explicitly the 
leadership of the Communist Party. These principles for 
the democratic dictatorship of the people were proposed by 
Mao in the speech, "China I s New Democracy. 1115 According to 
Mao, the organization of the Chinese Communist government 
will contain a state system which will be a joint dictator-
ship of all revolutionary classes and the political struc-
ture which is to be democratic centralism. He maintains 
that only a government of this type can thoroughly express 
the will of the people and prevent the monopolization of 
production methods by a few. Also, a government of this 
type will be able to powerfully oppose the enemies of the 
revolution and attain a genuinely democ~atic system which 
can achieve harmony between the state system and the po-
litical structure of democratic centralism which must be 
16 combined to form the new democratic government. 
To protect the people is the purpose of the organi-
zation of the people's republic, according to Mao. Only 
through a people's republic can the people educate and re-
form themselves by democratic methods. A reason for having 
15Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 106-156. Mao, 
"Democracy, 11 Strategy, 67-91. 
16Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 116-123. Mao, 
"Democracy, 11 Strategy, 70-75. 
8 
a eo-ri l e 1 s republic is hat it i.li 1 '1"lp -:he ".>eO le free 
t11ense ves ~rv1 i '1tcr 1c- 1.n e::::terna reac i "1'FlT'ies . 1. 1e 
ptr "'.lSe of this is to eep the ".leo e fr m tu1ni11g G') tLe 
wrong cause as lirect0d 1.)y 1e reactin'1.r ries c to c ,-1 n: 
th ir march tcrwc1r -l-'1e soci list s )ciety anc1 to •rare: t 11e Crim-
1'11 ntst socie C' )r the acco nlis:lli'e 1t of tlrn:::..r , ist,ric 11is-
s ~, the ext err i '1A.tinn 0 c ass d · sti ,1ct ·_nn 0 n t:rn re · , A.-
ti n f C•JS """Poli ta li sm. Hao ar ~ues that t 1e roeth0d s er.-
ployed by the Comn.P1:'.. c:ts a1 e der ncrR ~::.c and it j y per-
be a.ttai iea . 17 
\fao ' s theory )f t:~e Cl.inP'->e C n 1ist r1w,1utL.m--
i:;'l-1e~e rnsl, be an allia11ce ,,rith all f rces fi ' '· 1~ lrmeri~l-
is Emel fe1...1c ''lisn. The Ch~ nese Cnr.:nnli sts , u 1der lia"' 
C1 in.a I s realiti.es . As C'11,an Len~ na0 str1ted in wr~ L, L11~ en 
931+8 . 
17Ma ), "Dictat•)rship ," Cl)rJpress · ) 1al Record , Vol . 
everything the same way in China and Russia and neither 
would a good Communist •1118 
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It is Mao's concept that democracy must be all sided--
political, military, economic and cultural and it must also 
be democratic in Party scope and internationalism. Mao 
agrees that political unification is necessary, but he de-
fends the argument that only a government based on a demo-
cratic franchise can strengthen the political unification 
of a country. Mao thinks unity in the military sphere is 
necessary, but this can not be achieved unless there are 
democratic relations between the officers and men, between 
the soldiers and the people and also between the different 
armies so that it will be possible to unify these armies. 
Mao hopes to introduce an economic system which will con-
struct new industry and increase the production of goods 
end promote proper distribution and uniform consumption of 
goods and products. 19 
Mao Tse-tung is the only Communist chieftain--except 
Tito--ever to be expelled from the Party and still remain 
18chuan Leng Shao, "The Chance for Titoism in China, 11 
Current History, XXI (December, 1951), 337. 
19Mao Tse-tung, ttchi..Da Needs Democracy and Unity, 11 
The Communist Conspiracy, Part I: Communism Outside the 
United States, Section D: Cormnunist Activities Around the 
World, House Report No. 2243, May 29, 1956, United States 
Congress, Committee on Un- American Activities, 84th Con-
gress, 2nd Session (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1956), 520 . 
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in power . Mao has been expelled several times because he 
refused to follow the strict Party line, such as he did in 
the organization of the Peasants' Associations. He has been 
the only Communist leader--except Tito--to criticize 
Moscow 's agents. Several years ago he led in the arrest and 
removal of the last Comintern II specialist" sent to assume 
active direction of the Chinese Politburo and that agent has 
20 never been replaced. 
Mao has retained his right to the independence of the 
interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. He has refused to give 
Russia the role of high priest of the doctrines and rejects 
in general to the import of foreign ideas into China. He 
makes no exception of Marxism-Leninism . Mao thinks Marxism-
Leninism can be meaningful only if it c n be adapted to the 
conditions of a particular cmmtry. Mao demands the "Sinoni-
zation" of Marxism-Leninism to make it useful for China. He 
attacks what he calls subjective and dogmatic Marxism-
Leninism, a Marxism-Leninism which is not flexible and does 
not fit the objective framework within which it has to work . 
This concept is apparently directed at Russia and her early 
attempts in China and against those who try to look at 
China with Russian eyes. Mao warns that such Marxists and 
20.Edgar Snow, "Will China Become a Russian Satellite ?11 
Saturday Evening Post, CCXXI (April 9, 1949), JO. 
Leninists will not be tolerated in the Chinese Communist 
Party. 21 
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Where is the Chinese Com:munist Party under the leader-
ship of Mao Tse-tung headed? There may be some light shed 
on this subject by the four major goals of the Chinese Com-
munist regime, which were announced early in 1957. 
Peking aims at the implementation of a 
broad ideological revolution in the values and 
attitudes of the Chinese and a thorough going 
rice roots transformation of the structure of 
Chinese Society. 
Peking aims at employraent of advanced 
technological methods to develop Comr~unist 
China into a modern industrial nation. 
Peking aims at the creation of a uni-
fied and closely-knit apparatus of totali-
tarian control over mainland China. 
Peking aims at the organiz~tion of the? 
strongest indigenous military f'orce in Asia.'-2 
These goals would indicate that the Chinese Communists under 
Mao's leadership are concentratine; in the economic and mili-
tary fields. 
Probably one of the biggest steps taken by the Chi-
nese Communists is the introduction of the commune. The 
Chinese Communists hope the communes will be the answer to 
2 1Max Mark, 11 Chinese Communism, 11 Journal of Politics 
XIII (May, 1951), 247. 
22-Howard L. Boorman, "How has China Changed, 11 The 
New Republic, CXXXVI (May 13, 1957), 6. These are the 
goals of the Chinese Communists as seen by Mr. Boorman. 
112 
increasing production and at the same time a means of gain-
ing firm control of the educational and cultural lives of 
the people of China. The commune is to be all-inclusive, 
whereas, the collective concerns itself only with agricul-
tural production. The commune is designed to supervise all 
agricultural, economic, cultural, political, social, edu-
cational and military activity within its boundaries. The 
Party claims the commune is the final step toward collective 
ownership by society. In the commune personal possessions 
will be a thing of the past and all private property will 
become the property of the commune. According to most re-
ports the Chinese Communist Party leaders claim the commune 
is the natural development of the Socialist revolution and 
socialist construction. The Party nopes that by the crea-
tion of the commune they will be better able to control and 
use the labor power of the Chinese people. This tremendous 
labor potential must be harnessed if China is to become an 
industrial nation. 23 
The commune is, of course, aimed at complete de-
struction of the family. The Party leaders realize that 
they cannot achieve the socialistic goals they want until 
they destroy the family ties. If this conclusion seems a 
23These statements based upon the publications of 
the American Consulate General, Hong Kong . 
little strong, read from a Party directive of September, 
1958: 
We must undermine the capitalist type of 
social living built on the basis of the class 
exploitation system, and at the same time we 
must also undermine the family built on the 
basis of the class exploitation system. 
That kind of family which carried out 
individual production with the family or the 
household as the unit ••• was nothing but 
a poor cage for the working people •••• 
Individual domestic labor is also a renmant 
of the family under the conditions of indi-
vidual production. In the socialist society 
(individuals) will no longer have to worry 
over their inability to establish or to main-
tain a most simple family. 
In the socialist and communist collective 
body, everybody takes up labor with joy, and 
all jointly and reasonable share the fruits 
of their labor.24 
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The spiritual aims of the corrmi.unes are co-existent 
with the material aims of the communes. The Party maintains 
the commune resident must be stripped not only of his tech-
nical individuality but of his personal identity also. 
The Communists are carrying on intensive indoctrination 
sessions during leisure hours idolizing the idea of living, 
eating, working, studying and playing together. The Party 
thinks these methods have extremely far-reaching revolution-
ary policies. Of course, the communes have increased in 
24American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current 
Background, No. 520, September 30, 1958, 3. 
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size. The collectives ranged in size from 100 families to 
2,000 families, while the communes range between 5,000 to 
10,000 families. A serious policy of indoctrination in 
favor of the communes will be carried on by the Chinese 
Communist Party because their success is necessary for the 
building of the Communistic state in China.25 
In the realm of international relations, Mao sus-
tains, throughout his writing, the idea that the Chinese 
Connnunist Party and a China under Communist leadership must 
align itself with the international proletariat which is 
lead by Moscow. He contends that these people are under 
the same type of leadership and are striving for the same 
goals as the Chinese Communists hope to attain. Therefore, 
it will be beneficial for the Communist Party to join hands 
with all the other revolutionary parties which are striving 
to gain freedom for the working people of the world. An 
examination of the agreements and treaties of Connnunist 
China made between 1949 and 1957, plainly shows that the 
Chinese Communist government under Mao's leadership is 
leaning on the Connnunist block nations. Russia is the 
t . 26 major recipient of most of these trea ies. 
China 
1-25. 
25American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of 
Mainland Press, No. 1937, January 20, 1959, 2. 
26consulate, Background, No. 545, January 20, 1959, 
115 
The counterpart of the permanent and unbreakable 
friendship between China and Russia is the deep and intense 
hatred for the United States which has been promoted by the 
Mao regime at home and abroad. The general internal goals 
of Peking's campaign against the United States involve much 
more than the creation of hatred to sustain Chinese Com-
munist military ventures. Apparently the drive is used to 
distract attention from shortcomings and oppression at home 
and to direct blame away from the regime, which is always 
pictured as trying to save the Chinese people from diffi-
culties created by United States imperialism. The Chinese 
Communists try to promote simultaneously, contempt of West-
ern power and fear of having anything to do with the West, 
especially with Americans. 2 7 
The Chinese dream of copying the West is shattered 
by the aggression of imperialism. Mao thinks it is very 
peculiar the way the Western teachers repeatedly humbug 
their pupils. Out of this contact with the West Mao feels 
the Chinese have gained two basic experiences. The first 
experience is the Chinese Communist Party must awaken the 
27These statements based upon b~formation found in 
the Chinese World Outlook and the Chinese Communist Anti-
Americanism and the Resist-American Aid-Korea Campaign. 
masses in China arid bring the peasants, l&borers, petty 
b,,ur Qeoisie a:1d the national boureeoisie into a ·.mited 
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fr nt. The second exJJerience is to u"'lite in a co!'u~on stl·vg-
gle with tho e nations who treat Chi_ 1a with eqL8.l ty :. 
...,l.is w·1 , .Jf course , vnite the vi1.:.ne.se Co:n w1.ists wit~: the 
C, r nnist b ('C nc1.L,ions . 
Thns, Ha0 is fn 1 ,wing a p0licy of urii ting the C;_ • riese 
Corrn,1unist art and .:.ts g')vern.1""'lent wi 1 tie Ccll"ruri..i..sL 11 e 
ticris . e will t:.·a.de wit1 the anti-C("\n unist bloc "Jut he 
asserts V1e are s -cpressing the peuple and cal'l"ying n.1t 
L perialistlc tactics as3.inst t~1e C.)1 r u!1i.:;t loc nrt.i,-,J._.s . 
1-:a , i.s de i11.::. tc-1 - a leader of t' 1e ~•,o-·ld C'---n1 u is-t r ,were t; 
and se~ris t be sec:nr·e i L ' i 
present tire . 
The.re has been consic erab 8 s_iecu ati,)n 1ver the 
past few n y1t'1s a~ L , t: e ..,.:.u 4.i. '.:'ic '-~ ., oi ·,ra'"' 1 s relint4 l h-
" .enl., o"' t' e govfrnr 1enLa posi tlrit1 ::-i.s C-na Lrini.n o-" the I'A .,., e I s 
Re~ub ic of '"'riina. A t'1110 .:: ... i0!:..•c ho.s r,3,di,l1.8d t· ls ::::ust, 
he still ret'ii ·1s the posi tio:n nf C"mirn~ n -:if t' ,e Centr&l 
Comrr.ittee 01"' t~ie c:.ri · n.ese Cnn11uriist P2.rt w~iic:1 iE' the 1.ost 
l e11tial posit L...1"1 in any cou11try 11.L1der- Com. · nis t ru e 
l Pca11..se -Ll1e Central C 1i a it tee of the Party dirc•cts g.1vern-
r e 1t;:,.l p0licies . _ cc0rd · ne tlo rep 1rts coJ·in0 ,L1.t of 
28111ao , "Dictatorship," C\ 11:ires i ,1..1.l Recc)r:i , Vol . )5, 
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Communist China Mao resigned the post in order to have more 
time to deal with the questions of the direction, policy 
and line of the Party and the state and to have more time 
to write about Communist ideologies. 29 
29American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current 
Background, No. 542, December 29, 1958, 6. This issue con-
tains the announcement that Mao had asked the Central Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party that he not be nomi-
nated as a candidate for re-election as Chairman of the 
People 's Republic of China. This report and others seem 




It is apparent that the policies of Mao Tse-tung are 
leading China into an extreme type of Socialistic government 
or, perhaps, more correctly a true form of Communism. hao 
seems to be in firm control of the policies being followed 
by the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government 
and his relinquishment of the Chairmanship of the govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China does not appear to 
have reduced his power as he is still directing Party policy 
and line through his post as Chairman of the Party's Central 
Committee. 
It see.ms that Mao has been succe~sful thus far (July, 
1959) in the implementation of his agrarian policies which 
have been an important part of his program in his rise to 
power. Although he seeks to inflate the role of the prole-
tariat in the revolutionary movement it is apparent that he 
is attempting to convert the broad masses of the peasantry 
into this category by use of the communes. It is probable 
that as long as the peasants are satisfied with Mao and his 
Chinese Communist regime they will be &ble to remain in 
power in China . 
Another major problem that Mao and his associates 
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must continue to solve is the industrialization of China. 
If they are to have a successful Communistic government 
they nru.st bring about sweeping improvements in the produc-
tion methods of the Chinese people as well as introducing 
new industries and increasing the output of products now 
produced. If they can solve these problems then it is 
highly possible that they will be able to continue to con-
trol the China mainland and maintain a Communistic govern-
ment. 
If Mao's programs in agriculture and industry are 
successful they will help solve the economic problems faced 
by the Chinese Communists. The introduction of the commune 
appears to be at least a part of the solution for increas-
ing the economic basis of the Chinese f'om_munist government. 
It also seems to be the answer offered by Mao in the edu-
cational and cultural area where they are trying hard to 
completely control the thoughts and actions of the people 
of China. If the communes are continued in their present 
status they will definitely give Mao and the Chinese Com-
munist Party ample opportunity to control the education 
and thoughts of the young people of China. It is also the 
hope of Mao and his Comraunist colleagues that the commune 
system will undermine the Chinese family system and trans-
fer the reverence which is reserved for the head of the 
~o 
family to the head of the state. 
Mao insists on interpreting Communist doctrines to 
fit the needs of China and more explicitly to suit Mao . To 
say Mao will fall or remain in power would be absolutely 
foolish. It is probable that Mao will remain in power as 
long as he controls the army and gives the people something 
better than they have received from factions that have 
ruled China in the past . The key to Mao's control of China 
rests with the military and police forces. Through these 
it is possible for him to eliminate the extreme reaction-
aries which are opposed to his policies and to re-educate 
the people who show possibilities of understanding Commu-
nism, but have been misled by the reactionaries and need 
to be enlightened by the study and practice of Communist 
doctrine. Apparently the commune system will aid Mao 
and his associates in maintaining a firmer control over the 
people of China and allow them to carry out large scale 
propaganda programs. By the use of the military and police 
forces and the propaganda programs Mao is able to introduce 
and carry out the policies that he feels are necessary to 
bring about what he claims is true Communism. 
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